

White Paper

Ethical Considerations of Continuous Distribution in Organ Allocation

OPTN Ethics Committee

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Executive Summary

Development and implementation of a continuous distribution organ allocation framework raises ethical questions that impact all members of the transplantation community. This white paper compares the components of an ideal organ allocation system with those of a continuous distribution system. It also provides an ethical analysis of the potential and manifest issues associated with a move to a continuous distribution framework.

The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) Ethics Committee (hereafter, the Committee) proposes this white paper to advise the OPTN Board of Directors regarding the ethical considerations of a continuous distribution framework for organ allocation. This white paper identifies several aspects of moving to continuous distribution that should receive additional consideration in the context of the ethical principles of utility, equity, and transparency. Notwithstanding the hurdles such a move entails, implementation of continuous distribution as an allocation framework can be justified on ethical principles and should improve the transplantation system overall.

Background

Continuous distribution is an organ allocation framework that prioritizes waiting list candidates based on factors, such as medical urgency, post-transplant survival, candidate biology, patient access, and the efficient management of organ placement. It is intended to make organ allocation more equitable, flexible, transparent, and agile than the existing classification-based system. While the classification approach draws hard boundaries between types of patients (compatible vs. identical; sensitized vs not; inside a circle vs. outside), continuous distribution simultaneously considers many factors that contribute towards a successful transplant.^{1,2} The consideration of multiple factors, as opposed to a single classification, is one of the most important benefits of a continuous distribution framework.

As part of a continuous distribution framework, candidates are awarded points within each factor based on their individual characteristics. Each factor is assigned a specific weight, so some factors will have more impact than others on a total score; however, no single factor will decide an organ match. The points are combined to create a composite allocation score (CAS), which will determine a candidates' position on the waitlist. This composite allocation score is constructed with multiple attributes which align with the National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA)³ and the OPTN Final Rule⁴. The attributes or factors used to calculate a composite score account for both clinical characteristics and the end goal of distributing organs as broadly as feasible to candidates with the greatest medical need within the constraints of the Final Rule.⁵ It is intended that prioritizing waiting list candidates based on their composite allocation scores will promote greater equity in the allocation system overall. The expectation is that the use of individual composite scores will better balance evidence-based clinical and operational decisions with the more global, values-based decisions associated with the multiple goals of a national organ allocation framework. The composite score also provides greater transparency into how the attributes are weighted against each other.

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The development of a continuous distribution allocation framework raises questions related to the ethical principles of utility, equity, and transparency and autonomy that impact all members of the transplantation community. The OPTN Ethics Committee suggests that transplant candidates can expect to experience some practical changes associated with the development of organ-specific continuous distribution frameworks. As each organ-specific committee develops its own continuous distribution allocation system, it is important that each effort identify how such changes will alter the balance between utility, equity, and transparency. Equally important is establishing grounds for how the

¹ OPTN Lung Transplantation Committee, *Update on the Continuous Distribution of Organs Project*, August 2020, accessed May 12, 2020, p.3, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/3932/continuous_distribution_lungs_concept_paper_pc.pdf.

² U.S. Department of Health & Human Resources, Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, "Continuous Distribution," accessed May 12, 2021, <https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/key-initiatives/continuous-distribution/>.

³ NOTA, 42 U.S.C. § 273 et. seq.

⁴ 42 C.F.R. §121.

⁵ Jon J. Snyder, et al, "Organ distribution without geographic boundaries: A possible framework for organ allocation," *American journal of transplantation* 18, no. 11 (2018): 2635-2640.

committees will evaluate the effect the new system has on individuals, as well as the ability to redress the impacts through changes to the system. Furthermore, it is critical to embed in each development effort considerations and measures ensuring that changes in the organ allocation system do not fall disproportionately on vulnerable populations.

Purpose

The purpose of this document is to serve as a reference tool for the OPTN Board of Directors and its organ specific committees as they move forward in developing an ethically sound continuous distribution framework for organ allocation. The OPTN Ethics Committee highlights where areas of concern may lie and aims to assist organ specific committees in closing potential gaps in equity, utility, and transparency and autonomy. This document hopes to contribute to the development of the best possible continuous distribution system.

While data, references, and examples may be specific to the OPTN Lung Transplantation Committee and its public comment proposal, *Establish Continuous Distribution of Lungs*⁶, this document should be viewed broadly and considered during the development of each organ system's allocation framework. The data, references, and examples reflect the information that is presently available to the OPTN Ethics Committee.

While the outcomes and impacts of continuous distribution are presently unknown, it is imperative to commit to discussions around ideal outcomes and continually considering how they can be improved. As continuous distribution becomes integrated as an organ allocation framework, the Committee is committed to re-evaluating and expanding its ethical analysis as warranted.

NOTA and Final Rule Analysis

The white paper is proposed under the authority of the OPTN Final Rule, which states that the OPTN is responsible for developing, with the advice of the OPTN membership and other interested parties, policies for the equitable allocation of cadaveric organs.⁷ The Ethics Committee offers the proposed white paper to advise the OPTN Board and committees on the ethical considerations to undertake as they develop policies moving existing organ allocation systems to a continuous distribution framework.

Conclusion

Development and implementation of a continuous distribution organ allocation framework raises ethical questions that impact all members of the transplantation community. This white paper identifies several aspects of moving to continuous distribution that should receive additional consideration against the ethical principles of utility, equity, and transparency and autonomy.

On balance, notwithstanding the formidable challenges enumerated in this white paper which should be addressed as each organ-specific committee considers whether and how to adopt continuous distribution as the new allocation system, the move away from arbitrary units makes sense and is supportable. This move to a national plan, it is important to bear in mind, remains distinct from the

⁶ OPTN Lung Transplantation Committee, *Establish Continuous Distribution of Lungs*, forthcoming August 2021.

⁷ 42 C.F.R. § 121.4(a)(1).

larger issue of national sharing of resources. Therefore, it also will be important to make sure that with the changes to organ allocation, vulnerable populations in the nation do not bear disproportionate consequences as a result. There is reason to be optimistic, however, that the move to a continuous distribution framework *can* ensure that the OPTN Board and the sponsoring committees consider the ethical principles of utility, equity, transparency, and autonomy to assist them with incorporating the appropriate correctives for disadvantaged or underserved populations within the larger whole. In this respect, justified on a case by case basis, it may be that the retention of some geographic considerations that are adaptable are appropriate and ethical. The hope is that a move to continuous distribution will allow for a more granular consideration of attributes in order to allow for the maximum amount of attention to individual patient circumstances. Indeed, a scoring system of allocation, as opposed to a classification system, has the potential to be more patient-centered and is consistent with the goal of improving accuracy and increased attention to each individual patient. Overall, therefore, there are strong grounds to conclude that the move to continuous distribution is ethically justified and something which will improve the overall welfare and well-being of patients.

White Paper

1 Introduction

2 This white paper is intended as a reference tool to assist the OPTN Board of Directors, and its organ-
3 specific committees, with developing ethically sound continuous distribution allocation frameworks. It is
4 intended to help ensure that the development of such frameworks is conducted in an ethically
5 responsible manner. It does not prescribe specific policy solutions.

6
7 The OPTN Ethics Committee (hereafter, the Committee) highlights where areas of concern may lie and
8 aims to assist organ-specific committees in closing potential gaps in equity, utility, and transparency and
9 autonomy. While the outcomes and impacts of continuous distribution are presently unknown, it is
10 imperative to commit to discussions around ideal outcomes and continually considering how they can
11 be improved. This document hopes to contribute to the development of the best possible continuous
12 distribution system and further discussions within the community regarding an ethical organ allocation
13 framework. The white paper should be viewed broadly and considered during the development of each
14 organ system's allocation framework.

15 16 Ethical Considerations

17 This section of the white paper identifies and generally describes the ethical questions that may be
18 associated with development of a continuous distribution allocation framework and how all members of
19 the transplantation community might be impacted. More specifically, the section identifies practical
20 changes that might be expected to occur as a result of moving to a continuous distribution allocation
21 system. The discussions are included here to provide the background information needed to
22 contextualize the ethical considerations discussed later in the white paper. The OPTN Lung
23 Transplantation Committee efforts to develop a continuous distribution allocation framework are
24 farther along than those of other organ-specific committees, and as a result, are frequently referenced
25 in this section. Although the OPTN Kidney Transplantation Committee and the OPTN Pancreas
26 Committee are in the early stages of a joint project laying the groundwork for their own continuous
27 distribution systems, the information provided in this section should be considered in the context of
28 each organ-specific committees' work, as applicable.

29 30 Addressing Ethical Principles Associated with Organ Allocation

31 This white paper will address the ethical considerations associated with the development and
32 implementation of a continuous distribution allocation framework. The analysis relies on the ethical
33 principles of utility, equity, and transparency and autonomy. As described in the *Ethical Principles in the*
34 *Allocation of Human Organs*, utility refers to the maximization of net benefit to the community and
35 equity (described as 'justice' in the *Ethical Principles*) refers to the fair pattern of distribution of
36 benefits.⁸ The concept of autonomy is associated with the ethical principle of respect for persons, and
37 holds that actions or practices tend to be right insofar as they respect individual's independent choices,
38 as long as the choices do not impose harm on others.⁹ Application of the principle of respect for

⁸ OPTN Ethics Committee, *Ethical Principles in the Allocation of Human Organs*, June 2015, accessed May 13, 2021, <https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/ethical-principles-in-the-allocation-of-human-organs/>.

⁹ Ibid.

39 autonomy must include consideration of the transparency of the processes and allocation rules decision-
 40 makers use.¹⁰ The OPTN Ethics Committee undertakes this white paper in conjunction with other OPTN
 41 efforts addressing continuous distribution as an allocation framework.

42
 43 The Final Rule requires the OPTN to develop allocation policies that are equitable and promote the
 44 efficient management of organ placement.¹¹ As previously discussed, adoption of a continuous
 45 distribution allocation framework is intended to improve the system’s equity and make it more agile,
 46 thus improving its efficiency. This white paper examines the extent to which the ethical principles are
 47 addressed as part of the continuous distribution frameworks being developed by the OPTN’s organ-
 48 specific committees. Ethical analyses of previous changes to allocation policy have suggested mixed
 49 results in terms of improving equity, efficiency, and respect for autonomy.^{12,13,14}

50
 51 The Committee would like the Board to consider issuing the white paper below as a guidance document
 52 and reference tool for organ specific OPTN committees to consider when developing continuous
 53 distribution as their organ allocation framework. The development of this new allocation framework
 54 impacts all members of the transplantation community and thus an ethical analysis of this framework
 55 should be accessible to all members of the transplantation community.

56 57 *Practical Changes Expected with Implementing Continuous Distribution*

58 In reviewing the work of other committees to develop organ-specific continuous distribution allocation
 59 systems, there appear to be recurring practical changes that fall within one of the categories below:

- 60 • Changes in calculating existing measurements
- 61 • Clarifying and re-prioritizing the weight of factors
- 62 • Addition of new measures

63 Some background on each of these changes is provided here to contextualize the ethical considerations
 64 discussed later in the white paper. While examples below may be specific to the OPTN Lung
 65 Committee’s continuous distribution efforts, as they are farther along than other organ-specific
 66 committees, the following information should be considered in the context of each organ-specific
 67 committees’ work, as applicable.

68 69 *Changes in Calculating Existing Measurements*

70 The current classification-based system places candidates into distinct classifications based upon their
 71 specific clinical criteria.¹⁵ Candidates are sorted within those classifications, but cannot move between
 72 classifications. For example, most organ classification systems include geographic zones as factors, or

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(a)

¹² Keren Ladin and Douglas W. Hanto, “Are geographic differences in transplantation inherently wrong?” *Current Opinion in Organs Transplantation* 22, no. 2 (April 2017): 174-178, <https://doi.org/10.1097/MOT.0000000000000400>.

¹³ Sharon E. Klarman and Richard N. Formica, “The Broader Sharing of Deceased Donor Kidneys Is an Ethical and Legal Imperative,” *Journal of the American Society of Nephrology* 31, no. 6 (June 2020): 1174-1176, <https://doi.org/10.1681/ASN.2020020121>.

¹⁴ Joel T. Adler, Syed A. Husain, Kristen L. King, and Sumit Mohan, “Greater complexity and monitoring of the new Kidney Allocation System: Implications and unintended consequences of concentric circle kidney allocation on network complexity,” *American Journal of Transplantation* (December 12, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajt.16441>.

¹⁵ OPTN Lung Transplantation Committee, *Update on the Continuous Distribution of Organs Project*, August 2020, accessed May 12, 2021, p.3, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/3932/continuous_distribution_lungs_concept_paper_pc.pdf.

73 measures of a candidate's distance from the donor hospital. Because current allocation systems utilize
74 tiered approaches, which prioritize candidates within geographic zones before medical urgency or
75 candidate biology, a candidate who is considered less sick than another candidate may still be prioritized
76 on a match run by virtue of being in a zone closer to the donor hospital. No matter how much sicker the
77 second candidate becomes than the first, the first candidate will remain at a higher priority level for
78 obtaining an organ offer. Implementing a points-based allocation system permits other factors or
79 variables to be accounted for when calculating each transplant candidate's score.¹⁶

80
81 In 2019, the OPTN Thoracic Organ Transplantation Committee detailed inequalities for candidates who
82 reside on the edge of the hard boundaries within the existing classification-based system.¹⁷ In the new
83 points-based system, geography will remain a factor in allocation, but it will have a diminished role in
84 terms of prioritizing candidates. Continuous distribution will emphasize the efficiency of organ matching
85 and placements which require tradeoffs between medical priority, equity, and system efficiency.¹⁸ The
86 financial cost of transporting an organ will be taken into consideration when determining this value.
87 With assistance from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR), the OPTN Lung
88 Transplantation Committee has received two sets of modeling to determine how the changes in points
89 attributed to geography will impact the overall Composite Allocation Score in order to ensure the
90 outcome is impacted as intended.¹⁹ Thus, in a points-based system geography will remain a factor but be
91 recategorized as 'placement efficiency.' The weight of this attribute can vary from organ to organ and
92 will be determined by its corresponding OPTN committee, while remaining consistent with the Final Rule
93 and based in allocation requirements.

94
95 The associated costs of transplantation, such as the potential loss of an organ due to distance or
96 ischemic time, the potential for slowing down the allocation process by offering organs to those unlikely
97 to accept, or risks associated with flying to procure an organ, are all considered within the S-curve for
98 proximity efficiency.²⁰ This rating scale is developed to account for additional inefficiencies that are
99 possible with any organ procurement and transplantation. The OPTN Lung Transplantation Committee
100 analyzed the efficiency costs associated with leaving the hospital, driving versus flying, and the point of
101 infeasibility at which a transplant program will accept an offer on behalf of a candidate.²¹

102
103 Currently, highly sensitized candidates are listed higher on the match run in order to increase their
104 access to transplantation. As with geography, sensitization will remain a consideration in continuous
105 distribution but will be remodeled to fit more seamlessly with a points-based system. In the
106 classification-based system, the Calculated Panel Reactive Antibody (CPRA) sliding scale is only used in
107 kidney allocation but this model could be expanded and adapted to provide prioritization for highly
108 sensitized candidates across other organ systems.^{22,23} Within the development of a continuous
109 distribution framework by the OPTN Lung Committee, literature has shown that CPRA can be a good

¹⁶ OPTN Thoracic Organ Transplantation Committee, *Continuous Distribution of Lungs*, August 2019, accessed May 12, 2021, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/3111/thoracic_publiccomment_201908.pdf.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ OPTN Lung, *Update*.

²⁰ OPTN Lung Transplantation Committee Meeting Summary, November 12, 2020, accessed May 12, 2020, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/4238/20201112_lung_meeting-summary.pdf.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ OPTN Policy 8.4: *Kidney Allocation Points*.

110 predictor of the level of sensitization in thoracic candidates.²⁴ Considerations for CPRA and highly
 111 sensitized candidates would fall within the category of ‘Candidate Biology’ and the weight of this
 112 attribute can vary from organ to organ and will be determined by its corresponding OPTN Committee.
 113

114 Blood type is a factor which includes both candidate and donor information and is important in every
 115 organ placement. As it stands, lung allocation classifies candidates as identical, compatible, intended
 116 incompatible, or incompatible, wherein incompatible matches are excluded from the match run and
 117 identical matches are preferred.²⁵ Through ongoing discussions and literature analysis, the OPTN Lung
 118 Transplantation Committee concluded the inclusion of blood type matching was to promote patient
 119 access and provide equity in the system. As a result, the OPTN Lung Transplantation Committee’s
 120 continuous distribution framework will award differential point values for A, B, AB, and O patients. The
 121 value of these points will be based on data reflecting the quantity of available lung donors that is
 122 compatible with each blood type group.²⁶ In addition to the above mentioned factors, blood type was
 123 included in the SRTR modeling.²⁷ Accounting for blood type to mitigate biological disadvantages will be
 124 categorized within ‘Candidate Biology’ and the weight of this attribute can vary from organ to organ and
 125 will be determined by its corresponding OPTN Committee.
 126

127 *Changes in the value weights associated with the measurements*

128 To assist the Lung Committee members in determining the weight of each attribute, a revealed
 129 preference analysis was employed. Such an analysis involves comparing mathematical trends to review
 130 how multiple decisions have been made. A revealed preference analysis takes the current, classification-
 131 based system and creates a baseline to measure any changes against. Results of the analysis found that
 132 placement efficiency, represented by nautical mile distance from the donor hospital, accounted for 81%
 133 of all the attributes combined. By contrast, waitlist urgency accounted for 7% and post-transplant
 134 survival accounted for only 3%.²⁸
 135

136 In October 2020, the Lung Committee members compared the results of the current policy against those
 137 identified through the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) completed by the transplant community from
 138 August 1 through October 2, 2020, and the Lung Committee in August 2020.²⁹ According to the results of
 139 the community AHP exercise, pediatric access was the highest ranked factor (22.3%), followed by post-
 140 transplant survival (19.4%), waitlist urgency (17.9%), and candidate biology (17.8%). Placement
 141 efficiency accounted for only 9.8% of the community’s weighting.³⁰ The Lung Committee’s AHP exercise
 142 completed in August 2020 found waitlist urgency (27.7%), pediatric access (25.5%), and candidate
 143 biology (19.2%) as the highest weighted factors. Post-transplant survival (9.9%) was rated much lower
 144 by the Lung Committee than the community. After evaluating the previous results, the Lung Committee
 145 completed the AHP exercise again in October 2020. The five highest rated factors from the exercise
 146 were: pediatric access (31.6%), waitlist urgency (28.5%), candidate biology (17.5%), post-transplant
 147 survival (12.9%), and placement efficiency (6.3%).
 148

²⁴ OPTN Lung, *Update*.

²⁵ OPTN Thoracic, *Continuous Distribution of Lungs*.

²⁶ OPTN Lung, *Update*.

²⁷ OPTN Lung, Meeting Summary, November 19, 2020.

²⁸ OPTN, *Continuous Distribution of Lungs: Summer 2020 Prioritization Exercise – Community Results*, October 15, 2020, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/4157/2020-10_report_community_ahp_prioritization.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

149 Following the Lung Committee’s finalizing the weights it will propose for continuous distribution,
 150 pediatric access, waitlist urgency, and post-transplant survival are prioritized much higher than they are
 151 under the current classification based system. It is also expected that placement efficiency will have a
 152 substantially lower priority.

154 Addition of New Measures

155 In addition to transforming components of factors used in current policy, the Lung Committee used their
 156 development process to identify new attributes for inclusion in the allocation system. In particular, the
 157 Lung Committee found opportunities to incorporate factors that can be described as addressing
 158 inequities in access to transplantation. The new factors consist of candidate height, whether a candidate
 159 is a prior living donor, pediatric status, and highly sensitized candidates. The Lung Committee considered
 160 other factors for inclusion, such as the likelihood of organ acceptance, the use of ex vivo perfusion, and
 161 HLA matching, but chose to exclude them during their current development effort.³¹

162
 163 Some transplantation candidates’ biological characteristics make it more difficult to match them with
 164 organs. For example, it may be difficult to match an organ with a candidate who is very short or very tall.
 165 A typical sized adult heart, for example, may be too large for an adult with a small stature. Conversely, a
 166 typical sized adult heart may be too small for a candidate who is above average in height. However,
 167 height is not addressed in the current classification-based system used to allocate lungs. As part of the
 168 Lung Committee’s efforts to develop a continuous distribution allocation system, the Committee
 169 considered the medical literature suggesting that a candidate’s height can influence access to
 170 transplantation.³² As a result, the Lung Committee members agreed to include the use of priority points
 171 dependent on candidate height.

172
 173 The Lung Committee also added new attributes for candidates who are prior living donors or pediatric
 174 candidates. Both attributes are included under the patient access factor. Although pediatric status is
 175 addressed through the medical urgency and post-transplant survival factors, the Lung Committee also
 176 created a separate pediatric priority attribute as part of the patient access factor.³³ The Committee
 177 decided that the rating scales for both prior living donors and pediatric age candidates would be
 178 binary—candidates get either all or none of the points. Under the proposed system, a candidate who is
 179 a prior living donor will receive a pre-determined amount of points, regardless of other considerations.
 180 The same is true for a candidate who meets the pediatric age criteria established by the Committee.
 181 Candidates who are neither a prior living donor or pediatric receive no points in those attributes.³⁴

183 Using Desired Outcomes to Optimize a Continuous Distribution

184 Framework

185 The Lung Committee has employed several different methodological approaches while developing a
 186 continuous distribution framework. As previously discussed, the Analytic Hierarchy Process was used to
 187 help the Lung Committee members consider the appropriate weighting of the factors. A revealed
 188 preference analysis was used to establish a baseline of weights according to existing lung policy. The

³¹ OPTN Lung, *Update*.

³² Jessica L. Sell, et al, “Short Stature and Access to Lung Transplantation in the United States: A Cohort Study,” *American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine* 193, no. 6 (2016): 681-688, <https://doi.org/10.1164/rccm.201507-12790C>.

³³ OPTN Lung, *Update*.

³⁴ OPTN Lung, *Update*.

189 Committee also utilized a policy development framework composed of quantitative and analytical
 190 methods to optimize the chosen outcomes. Scientific literature addressing the topic shows that this
 191 approach successfully incorporates ethical considerations.

192
 193 The “optimization” approach starts with decision-makers identifying the desired outcomes of a future
 194 system, as well as any potential constraints they wish to impose on the outcomes.³⁵ For example, a
 195 committee might identify minimizing waiting list mortality as the most desired outcome, but would like
 196 to achieve this while still maintaining the same placement efficiency and not increasing transplant rate
 197 disparities as a result of blood type. The proposed desired outcomes are then subjected to an analytics
 198 optimization process that determines the best policy solution. For continuous distribution, this involved
 199 identifying the optimal weights for each of the already established factors. Those weights were then
 200 used in simulation modeling to confirm the outcomes and check for unintended consequences.

201
 202 In addition to identifying the best factor weights, the optimization process has several other advantages.
 203 The framework encourages stakeholders to have deeper and more meaningful discussions about what
 204 they wish to accomplish through the policy changes. It does this by very efficiently and quickly producing
 205 the optimized results. Stakeholders can then use the results to further enhance their desired outcomes.
 206 Using this approach, ethical considerations can be included at the outset of any policy development
 207 activity, and throughout the rest of the process.

208
 209 Furthermore, it can be extremely difficult to determine what the outcomes might be prior to performing
 210 any analysis when trying to determine factor weights. In circumstances where there is a lack of
 211 information, it makes sense for the desired outcomes to guide the weighting of the factors, rather than
 212 the other way around. This can be most advantageous to ethicists for example, who may hold strong
 213 views about what should be the desired outcomes, but have less information about how to tangibly
 214 reach that outcome.

215
 216 Another benefit is that tradeoffs between factors can be modeled at a very granular level. Stakeholders
 217 can view a full range of results whereas without optimization there may only be a few options to
 218 consider. This type of analysis is valuable in helping decision makers understand the relative impact that
 219 changes to a specific weight may have on certain variables. As a result, organ-specific committees can
 220 continue refining their proposed allocation frameworks in order to more accurately and objectively
 221 prioritize candidates, resulting in more equitable allocation of organs based on factors such as waiting
 222 list mortality and post-transplant outcomes.³⁶

223

224 The Normative Justification for Adopting Continuous Distribution

225 What Does an Ideal System of Organ Allocation Look Like?

226 The Ideal Features of an Allocation System

227 To examine whether continuous distribution represents an improvement over the previous system of
 228 allocation, it is helpful first to consider what an ideal allocation system should do. For the upheaval
 229 associated with changing organ allocation to be worth the effort, its benefit ought to be clear. A system

³⁵ Ted Papalexopoulos and Nikos Trichakis, “Continuous Distribution: Tradeoffs through Optimization,” presentation to OPTN Ethics Committee (April 28, 2021), https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/4624/20210428_ethics_meeting_summary.pdf.

³⁶ Dimitris Bertsimas, et al, “Development and validation of an optimized prediction of mortality for candidates awaiting liver transplantation,” *American Journal of Transplant* 19, no. 4 (April 2019):1109-1118, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajt.15172>.

230 of organ allocation should seek to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number of people, while
 231 reducing waste and promoting placement efficiency, thereby upholding the principle of *utility*. An organ
 232 transplantation system should be inclusive, and not leave vulnerable candidates at a further
 233 disadvantage, instead achieving the most sustainably equitable approach to organ allocation, thereby
 234 reflecting the principle of *equity*. Finally, the new system would ideally be easily understandable,
 235 increasing candidates' ability to participate in shared decision-making and facilitating access to a process
 236 which directly affects them, thereby promoting the principles of *transparency and autonomy*.

237
 238 The ideal organ allocation system will furthermore successfully be able to accommodate all three of the
 239 ethical principles of utility, equity, and transparency (and autonomy), with a mechanism for making
 240 necessary adjustments on the occasions these principles come to stand in tension with one another.
 241 Thus, it would not adopt a monolithic, or built-in hierarchical, approach to dealing with attributes. For
 242 example, the ideal allocation system would not favor an outcome that only increases utility to the
 243 exclusion of other considerations. It should be fluid, comprehensive and flexible, attentive to both
 244 population-level needs and to the needs of particular individuals in special circumstances. An organ
 245 allocation system should on the one hand have enough power to be operative on a large scale, dealing
 246 with many relevant variables, while on the other have a mechanism for remaining aware of the needs
 247 and circumstances of a range of candidates, including disadvantaged individuals, pediatric candidates,
 248 prior living donors, candidates who live far from urban settings, and so forth.

249
 250 It is therefore paramount that a new system of allocation be able to simultaneously accommodate many
 251 attributes at once, and not unduly preference or focus on any one particular attribute or measurement.
 252 This is challenging. Establishing the necessary and sufficient set of metrics and measurements which
 253 should be factored into the listing of patients, determining what constitutes a widely embraced set of
 254 best practices, and agreeing on uniform definitions of "successful transplant," all remain elusive. Yet,
 255 there is growing agreement within the transplant community on the need for a more comprehensive
 256 assessment of the many attributes which go into determining priority for patient listing.³⁷ To take an
 257 example, the current emphasis in many transplant centers on an attribute such as short-term post-
 258 transplant outcomes is neither able to look at the full picture captured by a large population, nor
 259 positioned to integrate into its method of listing candidates other "patient-driven" allocation metrics
 260 such as waitlist mortality, turndown rates, and time to transplantation, as more meaningful metrics that
 261 incentivize utilization."³⁸ A healthy and functioning allocation system should be able to correct for the
 262 social disparities which, if left to inertia, would persist absent this extra attention, with the potential to
 263 unintentionally disadvantage some candidates.

264
 265 That a system of allocation is, *de facto*, poised to be revised should be seen as an opportunity to
 266 construct a more comprehensive, equitable, and transparent model than the one which came before.
 267 According to our current, classification-based system, once a candidate is placed into a distinctive
 268 category based on clinical criteria within a particular geographical area, he or she cannot move to a

³⁷ "Current Opinions in Organ Allocation," *American Journal of Transplantation* 18, no. 11 (2018), 2625-34.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajt.15094>.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

269 different category.^{39,40,41} In this regard, geographic areas become rigid and distinct boundaries which
 270 preclude any particular candidate's being given greater consideration based on medical urgency or any
 271 other number of attributes. These edge cases can appear to treat similar patients dissimilarly, raising
 272 concerns of fairness, in addition to concerns about utility and autonomy. Moving past a classification-
 273 based system would likely constitute an overall improvement because at that point a whole host of
 274 variables could be considered simultaneously as relevant in determining listing. As technology's frontiers
 275 advance, and as it becomes easier to address concerns about ischemic time when procured organs are
 276 moved from one place to another, an allocation system can become less constrained to give primacy to
 277 any one factor such as a candidate's distance from the donor hospital where a transplantation will take
 278 place.

279
 280 This considerably opens up the possibility of a more efficient and more equitable system of allocation.
 281 Specifically, it allows for the possibility of revisiting the full range of relevant measurements for listing,
 282 how they are to be weighted, and what determines how new measurements will be introduced. By
 283 recourse to a method of comprehensive *scoring*, and self-consciously constructing an algorithm for
 284 determining which will reflect the values we wish to see emphasized at any one point in time, we might
 285 give ourselves more tools than we previously had. This observation leaves open the question of *what*
 286 these measurements should be, *how* they should be weighted, and *whether* and *how* more
 287 measurements should be additionally considered at any point in time. The present claim is only that a
 288 way of allocating organs which is guided by specified desired outcomes is, on the whole, better than one
 289 where the measurements themselves determine an outcome, dispassionately and without enough
 290 attention either to the needs of a population as a whole or to the idiosyncratic needs of specific groups.

291 [The Virtue of Transparency](#)

292
 293 Having addressed what an ideal allocation system should do, the next thing to do is consider the
 294 patient's perspective. Patients, and the public whose organ donations sustain the transplant system, are
 295 entitled to an allocation system which is clear, easy to understand, and empowers them in a context
 296 that is otherwise overwhelming. For instance, research has reported that candidate populations face
 297 excessive rates of unemployment and the need for support in activities of daily living.^{42,43,44} This is
 298 relevant if only to point out the enormity of what patients in need of transplantation are already going
 299 through, increasing the burden on caretakers to make the transplantation process as easy for them as
 300 possible. Currently, patients face a sometimes difficult-to-understanding listing process where available

³⁹ OPTN Thoracic Organ Transplantation Committee, *Continuous Distribution of Lungs Concept Paper* (2018), p. 4, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/3111/thoracic_publiccomment_201908.pdf (Accessed June 10, 2021). J.S. Snyder et al., "Organ distribution without geographic boundaries: A possible framework for organ allocation," *Am J Transplant* 18, no. 11 (Nov 2018), <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajt.15115>; Jon Snyder, "Systems without Geographic Boundaries" (paper present at the OPTN Ad Hoc Geography Committee meeting, March 26, 2018).

⁴⁰ Jon J. Snyder, et al, "Organ distribution without geographic boundaries: A possible framework for organ allocation," *American journal of transplantation* 18, no. 11 (2018): 2635-2640, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajt.15115>:

⁴¹ Jon Snyder, "Systems without Geographic Boundaries" (paper present at the OPTN Ad Hoc Geography Committee meeting, March 26, 2018).

⁴² Fredrik Aberg, "From prolonging life to prolonging working life: Tackling unemployment among liver-transplant recipients," *World Journal of Gastroenterology* 22, no. 14 (2013): 3701-3711, <https://doi.org/10.3748/wjg.v22.i14.3701>.

⁴³ "Unemployment among dialysis patients is a complex issue," *Nephrology News & Issues*, January 6, 2016, <https://www.healio.com/news/nephrology/20180227/unemployment-among-dialysis-patients-is-a-complex>.

⁴⁴ Kevin F. Erickson, Bo Zhao, Vivian Ho, and Wolfgang C. Winkelmayer, "Employment among Patients Starting Dialysis in the United States," *Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology* 13, no. 2 (2018): 265-273, <https://doi.org/10.2215/CJN.06470617>.

301 data is both limited and hard to understand and in which the criteria for evaluation used by
 302 transplantation programs can seem subjectively and inconsistently applied by the transplant
 303 programs.^{45,46,47} Because of these challenging circumstances, it is all the more important that once
 304 matriculated through to the waitlist phase, the allocation process is one which can be easily understood
 305 and welcomes shared decision-making. With such high stakes, patients need to know they are entering
 306 this process on a level playing field.

307
 308 Transparency and autonomy are inextricably connected. Transparency without the means to make
 309 meaningful health decisions may contribute to frustration and a feeling of helplessness while a rootless
 310 autonomy disjointed from situational clarity allows for uninformed action. Hence, an ideal system of
 311 allocation will acknowledge candidates' uphill battle to understand their position and to allow them to
 312 self-determine to the extent that self-determination is at all possible. Ideally, patients would be able to
 313 contribute to the activity of characterizing their medical profiles. The process would be sufficiently
 314 transparent to eliminate bias, aligning with candidate priorities. While it is unclear at the moment
 315 whether any proposed scoring system would be able to achieve these lofty objectives of patient
 316 participation, the perfect should not be the enemy of good and progress should be pursued; the process
 317 could at least include an effort to solicit candidate input at various junctures to assure that the goals the
 318 construction of the composite allocation score are intended to reflect are in keeping with the evolving
 319 concerns of patients over time, and in fact, the concerns of a wide variety of stakeholders. Such an
 320 allocation system could have a goal of being completely evidence-based where it would be clear to all
 321 onlookers that everyone awaiting an organ played by the same rules. Relevant attributes would be
 322 clearly understood, and there would be clear objectives for improving individual patient rankings in the
 323 case of each attribute. Moreover, candidate (and public) input would be integrated into composite score
 324 development and weighting.

325
 326 It must be emphasized that these are ideals. It is a tall order to expect that any one modification to an
 327 allocation system could provide the impetus needed to provide optimal utility, perfectly equitable
 328 treatment, and maximal transparency and autonomy. But it is not too much to hope that the shift from
 329 one kind of allocation system to another would result in a significantly improved situation for candidates
 330 awaiting transplantation.

332 [The Need for Incorporating Guardrails into Machine Learning for Healthcare Models](#)

333 An allocation system should incorporate guardrails into Machine Learning for Healthcare (MLHC) models
 334 on which it may come to rely. It should be able to reflect the goals and values its creators have identified
 335 as important on behalf of all of the stakeholders and future candidates for whom it is meant to work.
 336 These desired outcomes, presumably able to be revised over time, should always be what is driving the
 337 justification for existing measurements, the manner in which we assign weights to these measurements,
 338 and the introduction of new measurements. An allocation system should not be seen as reducible to a
 339 super calculator, captive to its own computational functions. Rather, it should be able to incorporate
 340 new information and data points (e.g., with regard to biological attributes) as we learn of them in due
 341 course, reflecting adjusted desired outcomes as our deliberations over end-goal values play out.

⁴⁵ Melania Calestani, et al. "Patient Attitudes Towards Kidney Transplant Listing: Qualitative Findings from the ATTOM Study." Nephrology, dialysis, transplantation 29, no. 11 (2014): 2144–2150.

⁴⁶ Allison Tong, et al., "'Suspended in a Paradox'—patient Attitudes to Wait-listing for Kidney Transplantation: Systematic Review and Thematic Synthesis of Qualitative Studies." Transplant international 28, no. 7 (2015): 771–787.

⁴⁷ Cory R. Schaffhausen, et al., "Comparing Pretransplant and Posttransplant Outcomes When Choosing a Transplant Center: Focus Groups and a Randomized Survey." Transplantation 104, no. 1 (2020): 201–210.

342 Otherwise, we will merely have replaced one sort of classification system with a more complicated one,
 343 at a further level removed. One of the advantages of a scoring system is that it has the potential to be
 344 driven by values, by “working backwards,” determining measurements and weights according to an
 345 underlying ethics-focused and balanced account of the values we wish ultimately to preference at any
 346 one point in time.

348 The Normative Case for Continuous Distribution

349 Can continuous distribution do a better job than the current allocation system of approximating the
 350 ideals just described? The Ethics Committee takes the position that it can and now proceeds to make
 351 this case. We note, however, the significant caveat that many detailed theoretical and practical
 352 questions remain with regard to *how* continuous distribution will ultimately manage to be the
 353 comprehensive, optimizing, waste-reducing, equitable, and transparent reform which it has the
 354 potential to be. While we intend to make a vigorous case on its behalf, in the section that follows we set
 355 out to apply just as much vigor to presenting challenges which remain upon thinking about how to
 356 implement continuous distribution.

358 *Moving Beyond Distinct Geographic Boundaries*

359 To this end, in this section the Ethics Committee provides the normative justification for a shift from a
 360 classification to a points-based system. As explained above, “classifications” group similar patients
 361 together, where access is given to a class of individuals based on a few broad parameters, although the
 362 individuals themselves may have substantially different medical conditions (similar to vaccine
 363 distribution). On the other hand, ethical concerns related to the arbitrariness of “edge cases” could be
 364 alleviated by continuous distribution. For instance, a points-based system allows for all patients of
 365 comparable priority to be considered as eligible for transplantation at the same time. A points-based
 366 system is set up to distribute organs *continuously*: distribution and allocation is fluid and ongoing.
 367 Correspondingly, for example, as opposed to using geography in a manner which creates restrictive
 368 categories, geography in continuous distribution is more seamlessly integrated into allocation by
 369 determining how a recipient’s distance from a donor aligns with the different requirements found in
 370 NOTA and the OPTN Final Rule: medical urgency, efficiency, outcomes, and patient access, factors
 371 which, when considered alongside one another, create a more open and adaptable distribution of
 372 resources.⁴⁸

373
 374 As described above, the composite scores patients receive in continuous distribution, once calculated,
 375 will demonstrate priorities for particular candidates. Patients’ composite scores are by definition always
 376 in flux as more people become transplanted, go on and off the waitlist, and candidates’ health statuses
 377 are re-evaluated. In a classification system, one who lives just outside a 250 nautical mile boundary
 378 could be precluded from a life-saving resource; such a policy appears arbitrary and unjust. Thus, by
 379 taking into account geographical feasibility but integrating this consideration with attributes constitutive
 380 of medical priority, the move to continuous distribution is positioned to better achieve a balance of
 381 equity in access, while optimizing utility.⁴⁹ The following sub-sections examine the relevant ethical
 382 concepts in isolation, one by one, to explain how the move from a classification system to a scoring
 383 system of allocation coherently aligns with each principle.

⁴⁸ OPTN Thoracic Organ Transplantation Committee, *Continuous Distribution of Lungs*, August 2019, accessed May 12, 2021, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/3111/thoracic_publiccomment_201908.pdf.

⁴⁹ Jon J. Snyder et al., “Organ distribution without geographic boundaries: A possible framework for organ allocation,” *American Journal of Transplantation* 18, no. 11 (2018): 2635-2640, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajt.15115>.

384 Utility

385 With improved technology comes new possibilities for greater accuracy and precision in considering
 386 both patient-factors and patient-donor match factors. This allows not only for a reduction in
 387 arbitrariness in listing and prioritizing patients, but also for evidence-based improvement in some
 388 outcomes through recourse to mathematical optimization. Just as technology is able to allow for the
 389 safe movement of organs across greater distances, so does it also enable those developing an allocation
 390 system to better fulfill specified objectives of the principle of utility in a number of ways. The
 391 implementation of a composite allocation score allows for the appreciation of relevant patient medical
 392 attributes simultaneously.⁵⁰ This is critical both in terms of increasing the overall number of transplants
 393 that can be performed on an annual basis and in terms of preserving organs in the transplant process,
 394 that is, in terms of placement efficiency. Continuous distribution, which relies on the construction of the
 395 algorithm used to create a composite score can accommodate criteria as various as: medical urgency;
 396 donor/candidate compatibility (feasibility); candidate waiting time; graft survival; logistics and cost; in
 397 addition to any equity concerns which might subsequently be folded into their own metrics, such as
 398 social priority (pediatric cases and priority given to vulnerable groups).⁵¹

399
 400 One way of understanding the value of continuous distribution is that it offers a way *optimally* to reflect
 401 the end-goals of the system. That is true whatever those end goals are and how they are weighed. This
 402 is to say, if the process starts with decision-makers identifying the desired outcomes, as well as any
 403 additional values-based considerations they want to import into the calculation leading to the
 404 composite score allocation, then it is possible to accommodate these many criteria optimally.⁵²

405
 406 Furthermore, if the scoring system is sophisticated enough, the weighting of these criteria can be further
 407 refined based on what we learn about specific organs case by case. A move towards a scoring system
 408 opens up room for a targeted approach to optimizing the pursuit of OPTN's obligations under the Final
 409 Rule, including: reducing the inherent differences in the ratio of donor supply and demand across the
 410 country; reducing travel time expected to have a clinically significant effect on ischemic time and organ
 411 quality; increasing organ utilization; and preserving organs.⁵³

412
 413 Finally, the move to a scoring system is one which positions operators of the allocation system, e.g.,
 414 OPOs, to avail themselves of the most economical and intelligent decision-making tools when solving
 415 the many, and often distinctive, distribution and matching problems which a complex allocation system
 416 in a big population of stakeholders precipitates. By contrast, a classification system dependent on a unit
 417 of bounded areas constrains would-be problem solvers. In this respect, whatever the details in place are
 418 in terms of weighting and arriving at a composite allocation score, all other things being equal, a move
 419 to continuous distribution is supported by the principle of utility (and placement efficiency), for such a
 420 move facilitates the most complete, flexible, and resource-preserving approach to matching candidates
 421 to donors.

422

⁵⁰ Papalexopoulos "Continuous."

⁵¹ Bertram L. Kasiske, Joshua Pyke, and Jon J. Snyder, "Continuous distribution as an organ allocation framework," *Current Opinion in Organ Transplantation* 25, no. 2 (April 2020): 115-121, <https://doi.org/10.1097/MOT.0000000000000733>.

⁵² Papalexopoulos "Continuous."

⁵³ OPTN/UNOS Ad Hoc Geography Committee, *Frameworks for Organ Distribution*, December 2018, accessed May 28, 2021, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/2762/geography_boardreport_201812.pdf.

423 Equity

424 A case can also be made for continuous distribution on the bases of egalitarian considerations and
 425 respect for persons. While geography is an allowable consideration under the provisions of the Final
 426 Rule⁵⁴, the removal of distinct geographic boundaries directly supports the principle of equity by
 427 ensuring that the accident of one’s place of residence no longer prevents access to organs for
 428 transplantation. The elimination of distinct boundaries smooths access to organ transplantation across
 429 the United States, reducing geographic differences in access to transplant. The framework has the
 430 advantage of affording the allocation system the flexibility to take into account the idiosyncratic needs
 431 of each prospective recipient rather than utilizing a cruder method of treating patients as falling within a
 432 particular group and then assessing their eligibility according to a singular group characteristic.⁵⁵
 433 Research findings reflect this advantage in light of the principle of equity accordingly:

434
 435 *Ascribing characteristics of broad geographic areas to individuals living in those areas is an*
 436 *ecological fallacy to be avoided. It is not appropriate to assign risks, or ease of access to organ*
 437 *transplant, to individuals within a community grouping based on geography or socioeconomic*
 438 *status because not everyone in the grouping shares those characteristics. A basic tenet of organ*
 439 *allocation in the United States is to allocate and distribute organs to individuals and not to*
 440 *groups or geographic regions or the transplant programs representing them. A continuous*
 441 *distribution system is optimally designed to do this and to avoid organ distribution based on*
 442 *geographic or other boundaries and arbitrary groupings.⁵⁶*

443
 444 As long as the framework is implemented accurately, a composite allocation score has the potential to
 445 act as a comprehensive and precise instrument of allocation, capable of appreciating the needs and
 446 claims of more candidates than the previous system could.

447
 448 Success in this endeavor is dependent on the extent to which the composite score is sufficiently
 449 comprehensive and sensitive to the different circumstances surrounding all prospective candidates. For
 450 example, safeguards need to be established that prevent individuals in any way from gaming the
 451 process, as well as implement measures to prevent such individuals (or their advocates acting on their
 452 behalf) from obtaining transplants sooner than warranted by their actual disease severity; while such
 453 individuals may individually benefit when this occurs, the system, manipulated, overall can suffer.⁵⁷ By
 454 the same token, in order for the composite allocation score to be equitable, there needs to be room for
 455 critical correctives which can proactively be deployed to offset already existing disparities, otherwise
 456 ignored or insufficiently addressed in a mechanism that only considers how to optimize the weighting of
 457 biological attributes among a large population. These caveats noted, at least in principle, that the
 458 removal of distinct boundaries and the integration of geographical considerations (insofar as they are
 459 warranted by the OPTN Final Rule) into a scoring system that carefully considers a patient’s medical
 460 profile represents an upgrade over the classification system, which is, as previously stated, at some level
 461 arbitrary. To be sure, the crafting of the composite allocation in the movement to continuous

⁵⁴ “[A]llocation policies...shall not be based on the candidate’s place of residence or place of listing, except to the extent required by paragraphs (a)(1)-(5) of this section.” 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(a)(8) (emphasis added).

⁵⁵ Brendan Parent and Arthur L. Caplan, “Fair is fair: we must re-allocate livers for transplant,” *BMC Medical Ethics* 18, no. 26 (2017), <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-017-0186-9>.

⁵⁶ Kasiske, “Continuous.”

⁵⁷ OPTN Ethics Committee, *Manipulation of the Organ Allocation System Waitlist Priority through the Escalation of Medical Therapies*, June 2018, accessed May 29, 2021, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/2500/ethics_whitepaper_201806.pdf.

462 distribution has the ability to be fluid and flexible enough to incorporate values which are likely to
 463 protect disadvantaged groups.

464
 465 Finally, in terms of equity, the sponsoring committees will need to consider how access to
 466 transplantation is impacted by a move to continuous distribution. For example, the removal of distinct
 467 geographic boundaries corrects not just for the constraints built into a classification system as such, but
 468 also counteracts an approach that unduly emphasizes the priority of nearby neighbors over the needy
 469 everywhere. Stated differently, a framework of continuous distribution, expands the “circle of concern”
 470 in an outward direction, promoting inclusivity.⁵⁸ Deceased and living donation, both, represent altruistic
 471 instances of giving the gift of life, wonderful exemplifications of other-regard. There is no reason that
 472 the injunction to “love the neighbor as thyself,” appealing to many across a wide variety of religious
 473 traditions, should not also come to include the “one far off,” the stranger, not just the “near and dear.”
 474 While historically the concerns about the use of Donation Service Areas (DSA) as a unit of allocation
 475 were originally about efficiency, and there are no doubt reasons also to be concerned that attention to
 476 equity might direct us to pause before moving beyond any geographical areas, *theoretically* the notion
 477 of one, national and inclusive system is consistent with the ideal of “leaving no one behind.” As
 478 technology increasingly allows for the preservation of the quality of donated deceased organs as they
 479 are transported over wider distances, the focus of concern might extend beyond specific areas, while
 480 still taking into consideration geographical proximity needs and characteristics. The move to continuous
 481 distribution thus smooths boundaries in such a way so as to allow for reasonable (i.e., non-arbitrary)
 482 geographic considerations, and allows for the accounting of more granular factors that if not considered
 483 could potentially misclassify or exclude patients.

484
 485 *Transparency and Autonomy*

486 Once the move to a scoring system is complete, presumably candidates will be informed of all of the
 487 factors that go into arriving at a composite allocation score as well as the reasons for why some
 488 attributes are given priority over others. Ideally, every prospective stakeholder will have an opportunity
 489 to be heard and to be an active participant in the allocation process, at least in terms of contributing to
 490 the end goals the composite allocation score is meant to achieve. While there are complicating factors
 491 yet to be spelled out, a move to continuous distribution may in general be supported by the principles of
 492 transparency and autonomy. *Transparent* systems are free from obfuscation, deceit, and pretense,
 493 readily understood by the ones they impact, and free of complexities which block candidates from
 494 accessing critical information.⁵⁹ In this regard, transparent systems fuel a candidate’s *autonomy*, i.e.,
 495 one’s ability to be freely self-directing and have a say in what happens to oneself in the future.

496
 497 To candidates awaiting notification of an organ offer, a classification system which groups future
 498 recipients strictly in bounded areas for determining eligibility can come across as hard to understand
 499 and beyond their control. This, in turn, gives the perception that whether or not one has the freedom to
 500 avail oneself of a life-saving resource is a matter of sheer luck, independent of one’s medical situation.
 501 To some patients waiting to be added to the waitlist this reality can seem arbitrary, opaque, and

⁵⁸ Peter Singer, *The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).

⁵⁹ Definitions of “transparency” vary in sources from medical ethics. Some emphasize the notion of freedom from obfuscation and deceit, while others emphasize access to the relevant data, which, to be transparent, needs of be made clear and relatively free of complexity. In this white paper we take the view that both of these aspects of transparency are important. For a source that emphasizes both of these aspects, see: Maria Castelucci and Shelby Livingston, “Achieving Transparency in Healthcare,” *Modern Healthcare* (September, 2017); <https://www.modernhealthcare.com/reports/achieving-transparency-in-healthcare/#/>.

502 frustrating. By contrast, a move to a scoring system has the potential to furnish candidates with the
503 means to better understand all of the factors that go into arriving at a composite medical profile as well
504 as the reasons for why some attributes are given priority over others. Ideally, everyone whom the
505 allocation system affected would have an opportunity to be heard, in the design for the new continuous
506 distribution framework: at the stage of building the calculator for the allocation score, and, once data
507 starts to come in, at the subsequent stage of offering suggestions for how to refine this process to make
508 it more equitable. By expanding and changing the priority given to the eligibility factors—and reducing
509 the amount of occasions whereby one could be denied consideration for allocation simply because of
510 one’s blood type or where one lives—the new allocation system in continuous distribution will be less
511 likely to run afoul of maintaining the public’s trust, as it will be more likely than the one it is replacing to
512 take into consideration the specific needs of all whom it affects.

513
514 It will also have an impact on the ability for candidates themselves to predict or understand their
515 likelihood of organ transplantation. In principle, one of the potential advantages of moving to a
516 framework of continuous distribution is that candidates who are now assigned a composite allocation
517 score can be in a position to see more clearly than they did before where they stand in terms of their
518 eligibility for being listed for a new organ.⁶⁰ This remains to be seen. In this respect, the shift represents
519 for candidates a potential upgrade in terms of their own autonomous involvement in the
520 transplantation process.

521
522 The move to a scoring system of allocation therefore has the potential to open up new options for
523 future recipients. With the introduction of weighted attributes which will be factored into the
524 composition allocation score, the new allocation system acquires the potential to be more *predictable*,
525 where everyone affected knows where they stand from the outset. Furthermore, while the composite
526 scores patients receive in continuous distribution will preference some candidates over others, these
527 determinations are always in the process of being recalibrated as more people become transplanted and
528 the circumstances surrounding candidates’ specific healthcare trajectories change. The inherent
529 attention to the *revisability* of composite scores in the new allocation process, in contrast to the finality
530 presented by distinctive boundaries, on a collective level means legitimate and ongoing hope for
531 everyone who is desperately awaiting an organ. Thus, both in terms of predictability and revisability,
532 which also bear on the principles of equity and even efficiency, the move to continuous distribution
533 significantly buttresses patient autonomy and makes the allocation system more transparent.

534
535 Finally, the move to a composite allocation score presents opportunities for patient involvement in the
536 process of weighing in on end goals that the former classification system did not. Sorting out which
537 attributes are ultimately emphasized in arriving at this score, as well as adjudicating their relative
538 importance among one another, is in large part a function of procedural and distributive justice whereby
539 a multitude of voices can be consulted in order to respect all the deserving parties who have a stake. In
540 principle, involving all of these parties in this manner seems doable. If patients themselves are involved
541 in the construction and subsequent revision of the process by which composite scores are developed,
542 and their perspective is solicited on an ongoing basis, they are most likely to feel that there is an earnest
543 regard for procuring their consent. The fluid nature of continuous distribution features opportunities to
544 examine and revise the scoring system on a periodic basis, where hitherto neglected considerations may
545 be given a fresh hearing. What counts and why in this process could be made to be open and available
546 for all to scrutinize at any time, reducing the sense that one’s fate was coerced or predetermined.

547

⁶⁰ Kasiske, “Continuous.”

548 Challenges Which Persist, or May Be Exacerbated, in a Move to 549 Continuous Distribution

550 This section presents a non-exhaustive list of various challenges which persist when implementing
551 continuous distribution. These challenges can be grouped into five categories: (1) theoretical concerns
552 (particularly as these relate to the construction of the composite allocation score); (2) concerns related
553 to utility; (3) concerns related to equity; (4) concerns related to transparency and autonomy; and (5)
554 pragmatic concerns which address foreseeable problems which are sure to arise upon implementation.
555 In this white paper, our goal is merely to raise and briefly describe these concerns. Answering them is
556 the work of future white papers and policies.

557
558 Previous sections of this white paper have demonstrated that a case can be made to support a move to
559 continuous distribution as assessed according to the principles of utility (and placement efficiency),
560 equity, and transparency and autonomy, but we have attempted to state this case hypothetically.
561 Continuous distribution has the *potential* to represent a significant improvement beyond where we
562 currently are, but it is crucial to interrogate the assumptions made in drawing such a conclusion. Will a
563 move beyond a classification system be as fair to *all* candidates while resulting in more transplantations
564 as the overview suggests? Will the process at which composite scores are determined welcome the
565 participation of patients, be transparent and easily understood by them, making them more individually
566 autonomous in the end?

567
568 While a scoring system could be a great boon judged in terms of the principle of utility, even the project
569 of determining what are the appropriate *starting* set of attributes for arriving at a composite score in
570 order to most accurately captures one's medical profile, is extremely complex. Similar to all algorithms,
571 just in terms of predicting medical outcomes, estimates depend on factors included in the models and
572 the quality of available data. This calculus may additionally vary from organ to organ. In terms of equity,
573 as well, things become complicated quickly. To refer to an example raised by Ladin and Hanto,
574 transplantation policies "do not function in a vacuum;" candidates from one geographical area are not
575 all equally privileged, as a result of which some communities can afford less than others to divest
576 themselves of the especially precious resources they do have.⁶¹ To uphold the principle of equity, we
577 need to ensure that transplantation policies do not inadvertently exacerbate already existing disparities.
578 Finally, with regard to transparency and autonomy, there is a question about whether moving to
579 individual composite scores will overwhelm candidates. Minimally, composite scores (and the individual
580 attribute ratings which comprise it) require balancing at many levels and may lead to strange
581 comparisons (optimal efficiency vs optimal equity, etc.) that are bewildering to sort through even for the
582 most seasoned negotiator of an organ allocation system.

583
584 Pragmatic issues with implementing continuous distribution arise as well. In the concluding portion of
585 this section, the white paper mentions some of the potential complexities associated with the
586 development and implementation of continuous distribution, and sets out to describe, if not yet assess,
587 the ethical and pragmatic consequences that may result from adding or removing certain eligibility
588 factors, as well as re-prioritizing the importance of such factors. How will committees consider a
589 potential surge of transportation of organs from one patient population to another? How will the
590 committees consider balancing the quality of organs that are offered nearby versus further away? We

⁶¹ Keren Ladin and Douglas W. Hanto, "Equitable Access Is Not a Secondary Goal of Organ Allocation," *American Journal of Transplantation* 17, no. 12 (June 2017), <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajt.14387>.

591 will also address the ethical considerations associated with expense and logistics. For example, how
 592 might equity and utility be impacted by changes in the costs associated with organ transplantation as
 593 part of a move to continuous distribution? In mentioning these complicating factors, the Committee's
 594 goal is to be realistic about the implementation of the new framework, seeking answers for some of the
 595 practical quandaries which are bound to arise even if the case that the move to continuous distribution
 596 is normatively justified and can successfully be made, and suggest what questions the sponsoring
 597 committees should ask during the development of continuous distribution.

599 *Theoretical Concerns and the Composite Allocation Score*

600 Fundamentally, shifting from a classification-based system to a continuous distribution system allows for
 601 the simultaneous consideration of multiple attributes, and an opportunity to reconsider the weighting of
 602 attributes in determining a final priority list. Although intuitively appealing, a points-based allocation
 603 framework faces a number of challenges, largely related to the development and implementation of the
 604 CAS. While shifting to a continuous distribution model is appealing for the reasons stated above, its
 605 promise is conditional on achieving optimal prioritization, engaging stakeholders appropriately, and
 606 continuously monitoring and nimbly responding to unwanted variation in outcomes. These are largely
 607 dependent on how attributes are defined, which attributes are included, how subsequent weighting
 608 priorities are determined, and the process for revising the CAS continuously to reflect the latest
 609 evidence-base and adhere to allocation priorities. Three theoretical concerns arise in considering a shift
 610 to continuous distribution, though it should be noted that some of these concerns may apply to any
 611 change to the organ allocation system.

613 *The Perils of Path Dependency in Setting the Goals of Continuous Distribution*

614 A key question that the transplant community must reconcile is whether the CAS should be developed
 615 to best align with the outcomes of recent pre-continuous distribution match runs (and as such, reflect
 616 current policy priorities), or whether it ought to start from a blank slate, and attempt to optimize the
 617 balance between principles of equity and efficiency. Starting from the current model, as the Lung
 618 Committee has, presents the advantage that the shift to continuous distribution does not disrupt
 619 current policy priorities, but rather allows for minor changes that increase efficiency while not harming
 620 or worsening equity across a number of domains, including: blood type, race, and pediatric status. It
 621 should be noted that the Lung Committee intends to positively impact prior living donors and sensitized
 622 candidates. The Kidney Committee intends to positively impact pediatrics and highly sensitized
 623 candidates. This reflects small, incremental improvement that, while desirable, may fall short of the
 624 promise and potential of organ allocation reform. In other words, such an application of continuous
 625 distribution may present marginal improvement, while requiring drastic changes to the organ allocation
 626 system and substantial upheaval on the part of many transplant programs. It does not necessarily
 627 transform the organ allocation system to one that is closer to ideal (see above): one more likely to truly
 628 achieve equitable access to transplantation while maintaining efficiency. Other organ committees have
 629 expressed interest in using continuous distribution to make allocation more efficient but maintaining a
 630 distribution closely resembling the current landscape.

631
 632 What are the harms to starting with the current system and adapting continuous distribution to achieve
 633 similar distribution of outcomes as the present system or incrementally improve upon it? While a
 634 benefit may be that the shift to continuous distribution would not affect current policy priorities which
 635 have been widely adopted by the transplant community, path dependency also ensures that any existing

636 bias in organ allocation is carried into the new organ allocation system.^{62,63,64} By specifying the same
 637 attributes, especially if the goal is to have continuous distribution closely mirror the distribution of
 638 organs achieved by the current system, the new allocation model may inadvertently smuggle in any
 639 existing bias stemming from structural factors, perpetuating unwanted disparities. Determining the
 640 weighting of each attribute in the CAS poses a significant challenge to the success of continuous
 641 distribution. Yet, how to achieve the optimal balance remains unclear. Prioritizing one factor or set of
 642 factors (e.g., utility) reduces the relative import of other categories, such as justice, which may improve
 643 outcomes such as graft survival, but at the cost of retaining unwanted disparities, for example.

644
 645 While adjusting the CAS is possible, it will likely require phasing, and is subject to path dependency,
 646 making any future change more limited and incremental. Rebalancing the CAS may result in a
 647 distribution that is even less predictable in terms of impact on specific populations. This is especially
 648 true because continuous distribution projections are based on historical data, which include limited
 649 representation of underserved populations. This limits the accuracy of future projections and makes it
 650 difficult to anticipate consequences for those groups and should not be understated. While this is not an
 651 issue that is unique to CAS (or any allocation change for that matter) and these issues may arise from
 652 systemic factors, attention to underrepresented, or persistently disadvantaged populations is essential.
 653 The transplantation community ought to pay attention to how the CAS system changes distribution for
 654 the most vulnerable – who stands to gain and who stands to lose access to organs? Structural
 655 disadvantage, by race or other protected category (e.g., deprioritizing people with disabilities) would be
 656 an invidious and problematic result. This is not meant to imply that such disadvantage will be
 657 exacerbated by CAS; in fact, it may be alleviated by ethical guardrails. Still, ensuring that allocation
 658 systems do not perpetuate existing disadvantages, if any, must be a primary goal of any major change to
 659 system of organ allocation.⁶⁵

660
 661 As such, an intentional approach should be taken in developing the CAS. In developing the CAS and
 662 more broadly in considering continuous distribution, attention must be paid to understanding and
 663 responding to the mechanisms underlying structural, institutional, interpersonal, and internalized
 664 discrimination. In the context of racism, Purnell et al. explain:

665
 666 *“Structural racism refers to the mechanisms by which societies foster discrimination through*
 667 *systems of employment, housing, education, income, healthcare, and criminal justice that*
 668 *reinforce discriminatory beliefs, values, and distribution of resources. Within the context of*
 669 *transplantation, examples of structural racism include racial disparities in employment, wealth,*
 670 *and private health insurance; access to and utilization of primary healthcare and specialty care*

⁶² David Wilsford, “Path Dependency, or Why History Makes It Difficult but Not Impossible to Reform Health Care Systems in a Big Way,” *Journal of Public Policy* 14, no. 3 (November 2008): 251-283, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X00007285>.

⁶³ Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

⁶⁴ M. Rosario Perello-Marin, Juan A. Marin-Garcia, and Javier Marcos-Cuevas, “Towards a path dependence approach to study management innovation,” *Management Decision* 51, no. 5 (May 2013): 1037-1046, <https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-08-2012-0605>.

⁶⁵ The use of “existing disadvantages” is intended to reflect the limitations associated with the data collected and analyzed for use in the current organ allocation system. For instance, SRTR acknowledges data limitations associated with the simulated allocation models (SAM) created for each organ. The Liver Simulated Allocation Model (LSAM) User’s Manual prepared in October 2019 acknowledges that “any bias or omissions in the input data may affect simulation results.” The LSAM also discusses several specific limitations to consider when using the material and interpreting its results, including: reliance on historical data and standardized behavior. The user’s manuals for other organ’s Simulated allocation models also identify limitations. Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients, “Liver Simulated Allocation Model User’s Guide: Version 2019,” pp. 34-35, <https://www.srtr.org/media/1361/lSAM-2019-User-Guide.pdf>.

671 coordination; economic deprivation within racially segregated neighborhoods; and lack of
 672 widespread cultural-, linguistic-, and literacy-appropriate treatment decision support.
 673 Institutional racism, which refers to system-wide discrimination, either deliberately or indirectly,
 674 against specific groups of people, may manifest itself as suboptimal provider communication and
 675 education about transplant as a treatment option for Black patients, as well as differential rates
 676 of timely transplant referral and evaluation due to cultural assumptions or stereotypes about
 677 patient preferences for organ donation and transplantation. Internalized racism may be manifest
 678 itself as fears and concerns about medical mistreatment and bias, due to historical and current
 679 experiences of interpersonal racism experienced by Black patients.”⁶⁶

680
 681 Thus far, discussion of continuous distribution has not sufficiently examined its potential impact on
 682 these multiplicative forms of racism and discrimination. Moreover, models have not sufficiently clarified
 683 potential proactive, anti-racist, anti-discriminatory approaches. Although continuous distribution allows
 684 for the simultaneous consideration of all factors, specifying thresholds (or ethical “guardrails”) for many
 685 intersecting variables may ultimately diminish efficiency gains, and may be exceptionally complex,
 686 limiting transparency.

687
 688 In light of existing disparities, many theories of justice would suggest that major changes to organ
 689 allocation, including shifting to continuous distribution, *should* represent a significant improvement
 690 upon current policy priorities for populations worse-off. The CAS should attempt to develop a
 691 comprehensive list of factors, consider the importance of each factor, or set of factors, a priori to ensure
 692 that they represent the optimal balance of ethical principles, as stated in NOTA,⁶⁷ not merely reflecting
 693 the balance achieved at present or a slight improvement.

694
 695 *The Importance of Diverse Expertise in Determining CAS*

696 Given its central role to determining the distribution and prioritization of life-saving organs, much rests
 697 on the formation, structure, and process of refining the CAS. Whose expertise and perspective should
 698 determine the balance and inclusion of factors in the CAS? Thus far, the Lung Committee (and OPTN
 699 more broadly) have engaged largely the professional and scientific transplant community in the analytic
 700 hierarchy process. By soliciting input largely from scientific, clinical, and professional experts (also some
 701 highly engaged patients and donor families) findings informing the development of CAS (and continuous
 702 distribution more broadly) reflect a specific expertise, which although valuable, is not necessarily
 703 generalizable.

704
 705 Veatch characterizes normative and empirical problems embedded in generalization of expertise in the
 706 following way:

707
 708 “Generalization of expertise arises when, consciously or unconsciously, it is assumed that an
 709 individual with scientific expertise in a particular area also has expertise in the value judgments
 710 necessary to make-policy recommendations simply because he has scientific expertise. This
 711 assumption is very pervasive in decision making in scientific areas, but unwarranted. To reject
 712 this assumption does not imply that those with scientific expertise have no right or authority to

⁶⁶ Tanjala S. Purnell, Dineen C. Simpson, Clive O. Callender, and L. Ebony Boulware, “Dismantling structural racism as a root cause of racial disparities in COVID-19 and transplantation,” *American Journal of Transplantation*, (February 2021), <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajt.16543>.

⁶⁷ 42 U.S.C. § 273 et. seq.

713 make policy recommendations. It does not even imply that some individuals with the scientific
 714 expertise might not also have expertise in the ethical and other value considerations which go
 715 into policy making. But such relationships must be demonstrated and such demonstrations are
 716 difficult to come by.”⁶⁸
 717

718 The difficulty of generalizing expertise is one of conflating expertise in technical, scientific, or clinical
 719 knowledge and experience with knowledge of what is morally required or knowledge that stems from
 720 the lived experience in a particular domain. From polling the OPTN transplant community exclusively,
 721 problems with generalization of expertise in the context of continuous distribution are twofold: First, it
 722 conflates expertise in transplantation with evaluative expertise in setting ethical priorities for organ
 723 allocation. Second, it presupposes a level of diversity of perspectives and participation that may not
 724 currently be represented. This is partly an empirical question which future work should investigate more
 725 thoroughly.
 726

727 An argument can be made that the scientific, clinical, and professional expertise of transplant experts is
 728 correlated with the moral and policy making expertise relevant to organ allocation policy. Transplant
 729 clinicians, professional stakeholders, patients, and donor families have extensive exposure to the inner
 730 workings of transplantation, which the general public does not. They have witnessed tragedy. They have
 731 invested years in training and in practice. They have experienced the stress of patients and families
 732 waiting desperately for life-saving organs, the disappointments of graft failures, the costs and risks
 733 associated with sustaining transplant centers. Such perspective is invaluable and critical in anticipating
 734 potential benefits and pitfalls of implementing new systems. Yet, such exposure does not necessarily
 735 afford one the moral expertise to determine how to balance organ allocation priorities. Intimate
 736 exposure to any field inherently changes one’s perspective.⁶⁹ Even if the experiences of scientific experts
 737 were to increase sensitivity and their ability to sympathize with alternative courses of action, it would be
 738 impossible for such expertise to convey the spectrum of relevant perspectives. In this context, expertise
 739 as a transplant professional may decrease the likelihood that someone has experience as a transplant
 740 patient or a caregiver of a pediatric candidate, or as a person with disabilities, for example. Other
 741 important areas of expertise are known to be underrepresented in the transplant community, including
 742 expertise represented by Black and indigenous people of color.
 743

744 Worth noting, in the current CAS system, although consultation is not sufficiently diverse, it may
 745 represent a marked improvement over prior systems of allocation in attempting to engage the
 746 transplant community. Still, these efforts have largely been focused on stakeholders represented within
 747 OPTN. Far broader engagement is needed to truly achieve diversity of perspectives.
 748

749 Sometimes scientific or clinical expertise may inform a perspective that is divorced from the moral
 750 sensitivity needed for policy decisions. For example, Veatch notes that, “it also can be argued that long
 751 periods of experience with the same kind of complex problem could inure one to the personal feelings
 752 of those involved and leave one insensitive to what is uniquely morally required. Years of constant
 753 contact with suffering and illness may produce defense mechanisms for avoiding the serious personal
 754 dimensions of one’s work.”
 755

⁶⁸ Robert M. Veatch, “Generalization of expertise,” *The Hastings Center Studies* 1, no. 2 (1973): 29-40.

⁶⁹ Peter A. Ubel, “Medical Facts versus Value Judgements – Toward Preference-Sensitive Guidelines,” *The New England Journal of Medicine* 372, (2015): 2475-2477, <https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1504245>

756 As such, integrating community preferences into the development of CAS by incorporating community
 757 values as opposed to technical skills, is an important step. Here the import of inclusively defining the
 758 “transplant community”, including the community of patients with organ failure or precursors to organ
 759 failure, and a subset of the public (perhaps with no affiliation to the transplant community), as they are
 760 stakeholders both as potential future patients and donors. Including diverse representation is crucial.
 761 Key to the success of such an effort is a system of checks and balances, ensuring that public preferences
 762 are fairly represented, and that they are checked by normative principles governing fair allocation of
 763 resources. For example, even if publicly held views at a time supported distributing organs according to
 764 social deservingness, or economic productivity, (criteria historically used outside in allocating scarce
 765 health resources), these notions would be rejected on the grounds that they violate key conceptions of
 766 justice: not treating people as a means to end; respect for persons; and facilitating discrimination
 767 according to protected categories. These comparisons are meant to be illustrative and are not the actual
 768 comparisons considered in the AHP. Several descriptions of AHP and the exercise were available on the
 769 OPTN website.⁷⁰

770
 771 Perhaps it makes most sense to first decide how much impact justice should have compared to utility.
 772 For example, should the system tolerate a CAS that reduces in any way the number of organs offered to
 773 Black people or sensitized patients? Should we specify that CAS should improve equity from existing
 774 standards? These questions are not merely empirical, depending on the changing views of the American
 775 population or transplant clinicians and professionals, who are currently the majority of respondents.
 776 Instead, a thoughtful, deliberative process is required to set in place limits constraining the degree to
 777 which these weights are either affected by past allocation or publicly held views, which may be (and are)
 778 subject to bias.

779
 780 *Examining the Process for Revising and Updating the New Composite Allocation Score in Light of*
 781 *New Data*

782 Although precise procedures for developing and revising the CAS are beyond the scope of this paper, the
 783 Committee presents an approach to procedural justice that could be used to achieve consensus on how
 784 to operationalize attributes and balance them in the CAS. “Accountability For Reasonableness (A4R)” is
 785 an approach to procedural justice in which there need not be agreement upon principles of fairness or
 786 distributive justice priorities. Instead, in instances where reasonable people cannot agree on the
 787 hierarchy of principles governing resource allocation, the focus should turn to agreeing on a legitimate
 788 and fair process for deliberation and decision-making. By virtue of agreeing that the process is fair,
 789 stakeholders commit to agreeing that the outcome is also fair. A4R occupies a middle ground between
 790 “explicit” rationing, by requiring transparency about criteria; and “implicit” rationing, that do not require
 791 that principles or criteria are predetermined.^{71,72} A4R has been used widely and in many countries for
 792 rationing of scarce health resources.⁷³

793

⁷⁰ “Continuous Distribution,” Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, accessed June 13, 2021, <https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/key-initiatives/continuous-distribution/#AnalyticHierarchyProcessDefinition>.

⁷¹ Norman Daniels, “Accountability for reasonableness,” *BMJ* 321, no. 7272 (November 2000): 1300–1301, <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.321.7272.1300>.

⁷² Keren Ladin and Douglas W. Hanto, “Rationing Lung Transplants – Procedural Fairness in Allocation and Appeals,” *The New England journal of medicine* 369, no. 7 (2013): 599-601.

⁷³ Katharina Kieslich and Peter Littlejohns, “Does Accountability for Reasonableness Work? A Protocol for a Mixed Methods Study Using an Audit Tool to Evaluate the Decision-Making of Clinical Commissioning Groups in England,” *BMJ open* 5, no. 7 (2015): e007908–e007908.

794 A4R requires that the following criteria must be met to ensure procedural justice: First, the process must
 795 be public (fully transparent) about the grounds for its decisions. Second, the decision must rest on
 796 reasons that stakeholders can agree are relevant. Third, decisions should be revisable in light of new
 797 evidence and arguments. Finally, there should be assurance through enforcement that these conditions
 798 (publicity, relevance, and revisability) are met.

799
 800 Fair procedures must be empirically feasible and adapted to facilitate the goals and inclusion of
 801 stakeholders involved and affected by decisions. In the case continuous distribution, key challenges to
 802 be worked out in the future include: (1) Establishing a fair process by identifying the junctures at which
 803 ethical decision-making occurs. (2) Stakeholders: Identifying and ensuring balanced participation of
 804 impacted stakeholders. Note that this requires use of best practices to reduce the power imbalance and
 805 ensure accessibility of information to all stakeholders. (3) Transparency: An important point to be
 806 examined is how to safeguard CAS from becoming so complex that it cannot be interrogated by
 807 modelers, scientists, and informed patients. Replicability and comparisons may become exceedingly
 808 difficult to examine under the new system. (4) Constraints on relevant reasons: Fair minded people who
 809 seek mutually justifiable grounds for cooperation must agree that the reasons, evidence, and rationales
 810 are relevant to meeting population health needs fairly, the shared goal of deliberation. For example,
 811 rationales must not reflect racist or bigoted preferences.

812
 813 Fair process also requires opportunities to challenge and revise decisions in light of varying
 814 considerations that stakeholders may raise. This requires that, over time, the composition of
 815 stakeholders may evolve and change too, leading to different conclusions. When done well, deliberation
 816 is likely to yield decisions more sensitive to individual variations (or impacts on minority groups),
 817 provided that stakeholder involvement is sufficient (and not tokenistic).

818
 819 However, this can only be done through a robust post implementation evaluation plan. Development of
 820 an analytic framework in line with allocation change ensures that there is not a lag in data collection or
 821 analysis and allows for an ongoing process to implement changes to balance unintended consequences
 822 to equity. Ethical monitoring can be done through developing regular review periods, to analyze data
 823 and implement changes in a systematic and routine manner, and doing so in a way that is accountable,
 824 transparent, and has respect for the public, individuals, and communities.⁷⁴

825
 826 While collection of data is essential, evaluation of the outcomes of interest requires data analysis to
 827 understand the effects of changes in allocation. This is in line with a directive in NOTA (1984) to “collect,
 828 analyze, and publish data concerning organ donation and transplants.”⁷⁵ Development of an analytic
 829 framework in line with allocation change ensures that there is not a lag in data collection or analysis.
 830 Furthermore, specific timeframes (i.e., annually) should be established to ensure that changes made for
 831 the sake of more equitable distribution of organs is indeed more equitable, as well as monitor for
 832 unforeseen inequities. The ethical use of data and subsequent analysis should also follow the Federal
 833 Data Strategy – Data Ethics Framework set out in September 2020, which advocates for accountability,
 834 transparency and respect for the public, individuals, and communities.⁷⁶

835

⁷⁵ 42 U.S.C. § 274.2(h).

⁷⁶ Federal Data Strategy, *Data Ethics Framework*, September 2020, accessed May 23, 2021, <https://strategy-staging.data.gov/assets/docs/data-ethics-framework-action-14-draft-2020-sep-2.pdf>.

836 While A4R makes it possible to educate all stakeholders about the substance of deliberation about fair
 837 decisions under resource constraints, it does not clarify how to do so and how to achieve balanced
 838 participation. When done well, A4R facilitates social learning and links healthcare rationing decisions to
 839 fundamental democratic deliberative approaches. This requires a great deal of skill, best practices, and
 840 oversight. A4R also does not clarify who should decide on the weighting of factors within CAS or how
 841 frequently should CAS weighting be revisited. While this paper does not answer these questions, it
 842 presents a robust ethical framework to guide the community in pursuing ethical solutions.

844 *Concerns Pertaining to Utility*

845 As defined by OPTN’s *Ethical Principles in the Allocation of Human Organs*, the principle of utility as
 846 applied to organ allocation “specifies that allocation should maximize the expected net amount of
 847 overall good (that is, good adjusted for accompanying harms), thereby incorporating the principle of
 848 beneficence (do good) and the principle of non-maleficence (do no harm).”⁷⁷ Considering changes to an
 849 organ allocation framework requires weighing both positive and harmful consequences of different
 850 potential allocation schemes.

851
 852 The positive consequences include “saving life, relieving suffering and debility, removing psychological
 853 impairment, and promoting well-being.”⁷⁸ To quantify these positive consequences for rival allocation
 854 schemes OPTN looks to “[d]ata measuring predicted graft survival, predicted years of life added (both
 855 from time listed and time transplanted), and even more importantly, predicted quality adjusted life
 856 years” as relevant.⁷⁹ In terms of harmful consequences, the principle of utility counsels that OPTN
 857 consider “mortality, short term morbidities (post-operative surgical complications and acute organ
 858 dysfunction and/or rejection), and long term morbidities (side effects and complications from
 859 immunosuppressive medications, psychological impairment, and potential rejection of the organ).”⁸⁰ In
 860 its *Ethical Principles in the Allocation of Human Organs*, the OPTN has clarified that consideration of
 861 consequences need not be limited to “medical goods,” but at the same time cautioned that in its
 862 application of the principle of utility “the social worth or value of individuals should not be considered,
 863 including social status, occupation, and so forth.”⁸¹ To clarify, while this does not “necessarily rule out
 864 the use of objective medical predictors of outcome (such as tissue-typing and panel reactive antibody
 865 levels) even if it is known that these factors are not randomly distributed among racial or gender
 866 groups,” it does, however “rule out excluding individual members of a social group or giving them low
 867 priority simply because the group has statistically poorer outcomes.”⁸²

868
 869 Importantly, “utility” need not be viewed as measuring a single item. OPTN’s *Ethical Principles in the*
 870 *Allocation of Human Organs*, itself for example suggests that utility requires paying attention to both
 871 positive and negative consequences of an allocation system and even the positive systems have multiple
 872 components such as -- “saving life, relieving suffering and debility, removing psychological impairment,
 873 and promoting well-being.” These different facets will sometimes require trade-offs. That is true under
 874 the existing allocation scheme. What is important about continuous distribution is that it allows us to
 875 see and adjust these trade-offs in a much more fine-tuned way rather than the blunter categorical form
 876 of the current system.

⁷⁷ OPTN Ethics Committee. *Ethical Principles*.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

877
 878 Moving from the current framework to one of continuous distribution is justified under the principle of
 879 utility if it improves upon the balance of positive and negative consequences for organ recipients
 880 overall, even if it exacerbates disparities between certain geographical areas or categories of patients in
 881 terms of those patients' access to organ transplantation. Moreover, the continuous distribution
 882 framework's goal of erasing "hard boundaries" is supported by the principle of utility. Utility justifies
 883 hard boundaries typically only on second-order administrability grounds, a kind of necessary evil. To the
 884 extent that a move to continuous distribution can improve on balance of good and bad consequences as
 885 compared to hard boundaries, it is ethically preferable under this principle.

886
 887 Of course, when answering whether a particular change in organ allocation systems is warranted, as
 888 OPTN has recognized, the principle of utility does not stand alone. It is balanced by the principle of
 889 respect for persons and, as is particularly relevant here, the principle of justice. That is, OPTN has taken
 890 the position that "it is unacceptable for an allocation policy to strive single-mindedly to maximize
 891 aggregate medical good without any consideration of justice in distribution of the good, or conversely
 892 for a policy to be single-minded about promoting justice at the expense of the overall medical good."⁸³

893
 894 *Concerns Pertaining to Equity*

895 Many questions pertaining to the principle of equity are addressed elsewhere in this white paper. This
 896 section examines equity from the perspective of how data collection and the use of such information
 897 can impact the fair distribution of benefits. Additionally, the section asks how the implementation of a
 898 continuous distribution allocation framework might further disadvantage groups whose opportunities
 899 for transplantation are already fairly limited. Finally, recognizing that almost any change in the allocation
 900 of organs will result in some patients being better off, while others will have new and/or greater
 901 challenges, the section considers the extent to which concerns about such results should be considered
 902 when developing a new allocation system.

903
 904 *Considerations of Fairness Must Account for Choices and Quality of Information Used in*
 905 *Determining Candidate Priority*

906 The transition to continuous distribution offers potential opportunities to better address equity and
 907 justice concerns within organ allocation. Important benefits include greater efficiency and the ability to
 908 prioritize particular contributors to the composite allocation score and outcomes to targets. Yet the
 909 system can only account for and prioritize data that is included. This means considerations for equity
 910 and justice must be focused on the choices and quality of variables along with what outcomes are
 911 prioritized. What processes will be established to determine the variables most likely to maximize equity
 912 in a continuous distribution system? Likewise, what impact does the timing of such determinations have
 913 on ensuring fairness throughout the system? Is it sufficient to identify the variables prior to establishing
 914 the allocation system? At the end? Is it possible to model the impact of different sets of data to identify
 915 which information best approximates the intended outcomes? For example, how different are the post-
 916 transplant outcomes for heart recipients when measured as graft survival or patient survival in
 917 predicting recipient survival?

918
 919 Thoughtful and intentional integration of equity and justice into the continuous distribution model
 920 offers opportunities to make huge strides in mitigating disparities in transplant access and wait times

⁸³ Ibid.

921 and potentially post-transplant outcomes. On the other hand, failure to integrate these factors risks
 922 denying the benefits of a more efficient system and further disadvantaging particular groups of patients.
 923 Recognition of the potential benefits or harms imposed by a continuous distribution model underscores
 924 the need to collect and incorporate meaningful and accurate data, to ensure that disparities in access to
 925 transplant may be minimized. To what extent might biases be incorporated into the allocation system as
 926 a result of who collects the data? This calls for both seeking this data and standardizing and mandating
 927 its collection so that the data collected from each member of the OPTN community is comparable. How
 928 does the allocation system ensure that there are fair processes in place to guide data collection and
 929 standardization? Initial models must be regularly reassessed in light of emerging higher quality data and
 930 the system regularly revised to promote improving equity and eliminate disparities in organ allocation.
 931 Additionally, how will the allocation framework be interrogated to ensure efforts to decrease disparities
 932 for a particular group do not do so by further disadvantaging other already disadvantaged groups?

933
 934 In addition to integrating factors related to health equity as inputs in the model, there is a need to
 935 ensure that the prioritized post-transplant outcomes are clinically meaningful and reflect the values of
 936 clinicians and patients. How will the meaningful duration of patient and graft survival be identified for
 937 measuring? But also, how can the potential risk of a technical criterion fallacy be avoided when
 938 prioritizing any outcome other than patient survival? That is not a reason not to consider any other
 939 potential outcomes. However, it highlights the necessity to engage in the needed ethical deliberation
 940 about whether and how other outcomes such as quality of life, functional status, satisfaction, cognition,
 941 or employment ought to be considered.

942 Utilizing Data in a Meaningful Way

944 The premise behind the transition to a continuous distribution model for organ allocation is to dissolve
 945 hard boundaries and create a more complete and flexible approach to organ matching and organ
 946 allocation. However, without robust and quality data collection, monitoring, and utilization, the
 947 allocation framework runs the risk of creating unintended consequences in perpetuating or even
 948 worsening access disparities that already exist between rural and urban populations, racial/ethnic
 949 populations, pediatric populations, and low socioeconomic populations in transplant.

950
 951 When weighing the attributes in creating a composite allocation score, how those weights are balanced
 952 against each attribute are values-based judgements, as opposed to data-based decisions. The specific
 953 weight of each attribute determines how much influence that attribute has toward a candidate's overall
 954 composite allocation score.⁸⁴ For example, the OPTN's *Update on the Continuous Distribution of Organs*
 955 *Project* states "many of the essential and controversial allocation policy decisions are those that are
 956 values laden questions."⁸⁵ The *Update* goes on to cite Veatch and Ross' discussion of the debate over a
 957 local or national allocation system, "[D]eciding whether to trade off efficiency to make the allocation
 958 more fair is fundamentally not a technical medical question. It is a question of the relative moral priority
 959 of efficiency and equity."⁸⁶

960
 961 Identifying appropriate data points to be used in monitoring for further inequities and standardization of
 962 this data collection should be mandated for transplant centers and monitored closely throughout the

⁸⁴ "Continuous Distribution – Lung," Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, accessed June 16, 2021, <https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/key-initiatives/continuous-distribution/continuous-distribution-lung/>

⁸⁵ OPTN Lung Committee, *Update on the Continuous Distribution of Organs Project*, p. 20, August 2020, https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/3932/continuous_distribution_lungs_concept_paper_pc.pdf (accessed June 16, 2021).

⁸⁶ Robert M. Veatch & Lainie F. Ross, *Transplantation Ethics*, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015) pp 377-78.

963 transition to a continuous distribution model and beyond. This is critical to describe and measure
 964 disparities in transplant, but also to improve and revise the model of continuous distribution to
 965 eliminate these disparities.

966
 967 In addition to including these factors how can the allocation system ensure that they are accurate and
 968 meaningful? The idea is that data collection should be standardized, but also that outcomes be organ
 969 specific and clinically meaningful. This will likely mean target graft and patient survival metrics should
 970 not be one year, but account for a much longer term. The duration will likely be specific to particular
 971 organs and may be longer than the timeframe currently measured by the OPTN and SRTR. To what
 972 extent will such a change introduce more uncertainty into the framework than a model focused on a
 973 well described and easier measured outcome such as one-year survival? And, how necessary is it that
 974 the model prioritize outcomes that are longer and more meaningful to patients and clinicians? As more
 975 routine outcome data is collected, this may offer an opportunity for revising the model to better
 976 promote desired outcomes of both efficiency and equity.

977 978 Known Data Gaps May Disadvantage Certain Populations

979 Lack of data or inadequate data about under-represented groups may reduce accuracy of modeling
 980 potentially affecting outcomes for these groups in ways that are difficult to anticipate. Current gaps
 981 which need to be considered and intentionally closed and disparities mitigated include 1) data on
 982 adolescent and young adult candidate listings and outcomes and 2) addressing racial and ethnic
 983 disparities in access to transplantation

984
 985 A vulnerable population within the transplant setting is the 17–25-year-old patient group who, based on
 986 their age may have to undergo transition from the pediatric to adult settings. They may be initially listed
 987 as a pediatric patient and transfer to adult setting prior to their transplantation or following it. There is
 988 currently limited data on outcomes of this population on the edge of age-related cut-offs in care. There
 989 is ample evidence that loss to follow up is significant in this age group.⁸⁷ Recognizing this, the OPTN put
 990 forth guidance in 2018 on pediatric transplant recipients transfer and transition urging data sharing
 991 between the two settings.⁸⁸ While moving to continuous distribution, how can access to transplantation
 992 in this population and allograft outcomes be improved so that they are treated similarly to other groups
 993 and that the harms they experience are not different from other populations?

994
 995 There are known racial and ethnic disparities in access to transplantation across solid organs, in adult as
 996 well as pediatric populations and hence in this move to continuous distribution. What mechanism or
 997 entity can be constructed to guarantee fairness around reaching consensus on metrics to measure and

⁸⁷ Taylor A. Melanson, Karie Mersha, Rachel E. Patzer, and Roshan P. George, “Loss to Follow-up in Adolescent and Young Adult Renal Transplant Recipients, *Transplantation* 105, no. 6 (June 2021): 1326-1336, <https://doi.org/10.1097/TP.0000000000003445>.

⁸⁸ OPTN Pediatric Transplantation Committee, *Pediatric Transition and Transfer Guidance Document*, December 2018, accessed May 26, 2021, <https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/public-comment/pediatric-transition-and-transfer-guidance-document/>.

998 monitor data? Moreover, how can such a mechanism be implemented to act on any perceived or
 999 identified disparities fairly and in a repeatable manner?^{89,90,91,92}

1000

1001 [Broader Sharing of Organs Increases Potential for Certain Populations to Face Reduced](#)
 1002 [Access](#)

1003 Medical urgency is a component in the CAS for continuous distribution. A candidate’s medical urgency
 1004 will be captured through multiple attributes and ratings scales that are designed to address the most
 1005 critical factors for waitlist and post-transplant survival. In addition to these factors, continuous
 1006 distribution also accounts for how efficiently organs are allocated by considering the resources required
 1007 to perform match runs, transport organs, and transplant organs. The Lung Committee focused on travel
 1008 efficiency and proximity efficiency to help determine how lungs will be distributed. Still, by eliminating
 1009 the current classification-based allocation system in favor of continuous distribution, the potential exists
 1010 for improvements in placement efficiency to decrease access to transplantation among populations who
 1011 previously benefited primarily by their proximity to the donor hospital. For example, how will the
 1012 committee consider candidates in rural areas and more populated areas who may have the same
 1013 medical urgency, but the composite allocation score of the candidate in the more populated area is
 1014 enhanced as a result of better travel efficiency? How will the committee monitor the waitlist survival of
 1015 such candidates to ensure they are not waiting so long as to make them un-transplantable in the future?

1016

1017 [Allocation System Changes May Harm Groups Experiencing Limited Transplantation](#)
 1018 [Opportunities](#)

1019 An objective of the OPTN Lung Committee in designing its Continuous Distribution of Lungs allocation
 1020 framework was to align the attributes with the ethical principles of equity and utility. However, a move
 1021 to any new allocation process has the potential for disadvantaged groups to become more
 1022 disadvantaged. In discussing the effect of new policies, Ladin and Hanto explain “the effect of new
 1023 [organ allocation] policies on already disadvantaged populations should not be neglected”⁹³ and that the
 1024 developers of such policies have a responsibility to “not worsen existing disparities.”⁹⁴ How can policy
 1025 development be enhanced to ensure the appropriate mechanisms exist to prevent disadvantaged
 1026 groups from potential greater harm? What feedback loops can be designed to measure the effects of
 1027 allocation changes across groups, and also address such disparities in a timely manner?

1028

1029 [Challenges Pertaining to Transparency and Autonomy](#)

1030 Despite the advantages of moving from a classification to a scoring system in terms preserving options
 1031 for prospective candidates, there are features of a scoring system which will make navigating the

⁸⁹ Amit K. Mathur et al., “Racial and ethnic disparities in access to liver transplantation,” *Liver Transplantation* 16, no. 9 (September 2010): 1033-1040, <https://doi.org/10.1002/lt.22108>.

⁹⁰ Sayeed K. Malek et al., “Racial and ethnic disparities in kidney transplantation,” *Transplant International* 24, no. 5 (December 2010): 419-424, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1432-2277.2010.01205.x>.

⁹¹ Alanna A. Morris, Evan P. Kransdorf, Bernice L. Coleman, and Monica Colvin, “Racial and ethnic disparities in outcomes after heart transplantation: A systematic review of contributing factors and future directions to close the outcomes gap,” *The Journal of Heart and Lung Transplantation* 35, no. 8 (February 2016): 953-961, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healun.2016.01.1231>.

⁹² Rachel E. Patzer et al., “Racial and ethnic disparities in pediatric renal allograft survival in the United States,” *Kidney International* 87, no. 3 (March 2015): 584-592, <https://doi.org/10.1038/ki.2014.345>.

⁹³ Keren Ladin and Douglas W. Hanto, “Equitable Access Is Not a Secondary Goal of Organ Allocation,” *American Journal of Transplantation* 17, no. 12 (June 2017), <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajt.14387>.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

1032 process of organ transplantation more complicated and thus arguably less transparent from the future
 1033 recipient's perspective, in turn also representing an obstacle to autonomy. With regard to the
 1034 construction of a process leading to a composite score, questions will inevitably abound no matter how
 1035 variables of attributes are ultimately weighted. Who has the most say in constructing the algorithm for
 1036 scoring? How will we go about soliciting the input of as many candidates as possible as new data comes
 1037 in and the scoring process is recalibrated? How will we ensure that the candidates involved are
 1038 representative of the diversity within the candidate pool? And how flexible will the process of describing
 1039 attributes themselves—which will have a sure bearing on one's eligibility—turn out to be in the end? If
 1040 in actuality candidates are to have little to do with this process, one might wonder how much autonomy
 1041 they are really gaining in a move to continuous distribution. If, on the other hand, describing a
 1042 candidate's profile becomes part of a process of shared decision-making, there is suddenly quite a lot at
 1043 stake in one's being able to adeptly and cleverly advocate for oneself. The new allowance for
 1044 participation might unintentionally confront candidates directly as burden, stultifying, rather than
 1045 enabling, their ability to act in their best interests.

1046
 1047 There are also concerns with the realizability of the ideal of transparency to begin with. As Amartya Sen
 1048 has pointed out, in actuality the viewpoint of the "impartial spectator" is not manageable and more
 1049 likely reflects the perspective of the more powerful and privileged rather than the impoverished and
 1050 disenfranchised.⁹⁵ By default, privilege is something that is imbalanced across strata of society and very
 1051 difficult to correct for, thus making the ambition of a transparent and strictly egalitarian approach to
 1052 allocation elusive.⁹⁶ Even if they are not "gaming the system," those with the most resources at their
 1053 disposal will also likely be the ones best equipped to secure advocates most familiar with the composite
 1054 score calculation, reducing the overall transparency of a system that might have been designed in good
 1055 faith to increase.⁹⁷ In transforming the system of organ allocation, it is thus imperative to be aware of
 1056 default imbalances in order to address them in advance and, in turn, achieve a process that is as fair and
 1057 open as possible in terms of distributing resources.⁹⁸

1058
 1059 In the move to continuous distribution, moreover, we should consider the pressure all candidates might
 1060 now feel to assemble clinical advocates to present their cases in a manner that is likely to result in their
 1061 scoring higher. This might have psychologically paralyzing effect on candidates if, in the event that they
 1062 are expected to participate in their advocacy, they are not easily and straightforwardly able to navigate
 1063 the system which assigns them a rating. Just as patients battling illness can sometimes feel
 1064 overwhelmed when they are given too many options at once which they do not fully understand, so
 1065 could a process which went out of its way to include candidate input frustrate its own aims by making an
 1066 already arduous ordeal more complex.^{99,100} An outcome which would not be desirable is one in which
 1067 the replacement of one system with another still left candidates feeling as if they were at the mercy of
 1068 fate-determining forces beyond their control. This could lead to a kind of paradox whereby as
 1069 boundaries loosened, giving hope and options to more patients, they did so at the expense of allowing
 1070 for a clear set of expectations for candidates, ultimately undermining a principle of consent a new

⁹⁵ Amartya Sen, *The Idea of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press Harvard University Press, 2009).

⁹⁶ Keren Ladin and Douglas W. Hanto, "Are geographic differences in transplantation inherently wrong?" *Current Opinion in Organ Transplant* 22, no. 2 (April 2017): 174-178, <https://doi.org/10.1097/MOT.0000000000000400>.

⁹⁷ OPTN Ethics Committee, *Manipulation of the Organ Allocation System*.

⁹⁸ OPTN Ethics Committee, *Manipulation of the Organ Allocation System*.

⁹⁹ Yusrita Zolkefli, "Evaluating the Concept of Choice in Healthcare," *The Malaysian Journal of Medical Sciences* 24, no. 6 (December 2017): 92-96, <https://doi.org/10.21315/mjms2017.24.6.11>.

¹⁰⁰ Benjamin Davies, "Responsibility and the limits of patient choice," *Bioethics* 34, no. 5 (November 2019): 459-466, <https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12693>.

1071 allocation system was otherwise meant to support. Complicating matters further, the introduction of
 1072 the composite allocation score could lead to a situation in which it became more difficult to engage in
 1073 comparisons between patients. The more measurements which go into determining listing, the more
 1074 potential there is for scenarios which come across as confusing, and possibly which are seen as
 1075 competitive.

1076
 1077 What would be ideal is to adopt a process which managed both to move past distinct geographical
 1078 boundaries, thereby opening up possibilities for all candidates, while not further handicapping anyone
 1079 who might find a scoring system too bewildering to understand. This process would be able to consider
 1080 several attributes and weight them according to a matrix of considerations, while still being inclusive of,
 1081 and user-friendly for, all stakeholders affected by this scoring system. It is not yet clear, however, that
 1082 the move to continuous distribution will be able to manage these ambitions.

1083 1084 *Pragmatic Concerns*

1085 This section presents a survey of how pragmatic and implementation concerns associated with a move
 1086 to continuous distribution might impact ideal outcomes. The actual assessment of these will be taken up
 1087 in a second paper which will also be intended as an instructive resource for the OPTN and the
 1088 sponsoring committees. Predicting implications of changes in allocation policy is difficult.¹⁰¹ Continuous
 1089 distribution is bound to increase complexity across the transplant system by disrupting existing
 1090 relationships and patterns of organ sharing between transplant centers and organ procurement
 1091 organizations, while confusing patients and resulting in uncertainty in the availability and prioritization
 1092 of organs. Potential challenges include the following:

- 1093
- 1094 a. Addressing geographical and center-based changes in organ supply: Similar to short-term surges
 1095 following previous organ allocation changes, some areas or populations that typically experience
 1096 longer waits for organs may encounter greater supply and shorter waits, while those with
 1097 historically shorter waiting times may experience reduced supply. To address these ethical
 1098 quandaries, sponsoring committees should review donation and transplantation metrics to identify
 1099 differences in how efficiency is addressed following implementation of continuous distribution. The
 1100 findings could suggest allocation inefficiencies, such as transporting organs from an area only to
 1101 have the same area import similar organs from elsewhere. Conversely, a data analysis could show
 1102 that the committee achieved smarter distribution; whereby organs only travel long distances when
 1103 truly needed and organs are transplanted close to the donor hospital to decrease travel efficiency-
 1104 thereby achieving an ethical balance between equity and utility. In either event, sponsoring
 1105 committees should review this data to determine if the appropriate ethical balance was achieved.
 1106
 - 1107 b. Changes and uncertainty for patients: Changes, positive or negative, have the potential to impact a
 1108 patient's trust of the transplant system. From a patient's perspective, the move to continuous
 1109 distribution raises considerations involving the principle of autonomy, and the transparency of
 1110 processes and allocation rules to enable stakeholders to make informed decisions. Will patients
 1111 approach multiple listing opportunities differently or donors consider living donations differently if
 1112 there is uncertainty or difficulty in understanding how continuous distribution affects them
 1113 individually? In addition to autonomy, efforts aimed at improving equity may become complicated

¹⁰¹ Sharon E. Klarman and Richard N. Formica, "The Broader Sharing of Deceased Donor Kidneys Is an Ethical and Legal Imperative," *Journal of the American Society of Nephrology* 31, no. 6 (June 2020): 1174-1176, <https://doi.org/10.1681/ASN.2020020121>.

1114 as individuals' identities are identified, reported, determined by others, classified, and contextually
 1115 understood by many along the patients' process toward and through transplantation. It may be
 1116 beneficial to gather this type of information in order to understand the ways these data could
 1117 impact allocation and whether the appropriate ethical goals were achieved.

1118
 1119 c. Changes in clinician behavior: Like patients, moving to continuous distribution may influence
 1120 clinician decision making. Also, like patients, will clinicians have the appropriate information to make
 1121 informed decisions? How might that information influence, or not influence, their acceptance
 1122 practices? Some have suggested that continuous distribution will result in organs traveling greater
 1123 distances than now. According to this line of argument, the greater distances produce longer
 1124 ischemic times, and make the organs less viable. Others predict that "smarter" distribution will
 1125 allocate more organs close to the donor hospital and only allocate organs long distances when there
 1126 are significant benefits in doing so; and therefore, reduce the impact of ischemic time on organs.
 1127 The sponsoring committees should evaluate potential changes in clinician behavior to ensure that
 1128 continuous distribution meets its intended ethical balance between equity and utility.

1129
 1130 d. Expense and logistics: Smarter distribution in continuous distribution, as opposed to broader
 1131 distribution, is predicted to allocate more organs close to the donor hospital and only allocate
 1132 organs long distances when there are significant benefits in doing so. However, the sponsoring
 1133 committees should evaluate how the proposed changes might potentially impact utility throughout
 1134 the entire allocation process. Logistically, will the efficiencies and increased utility being associated
 1135 with a continuous framework now be diminished in the future when the system has to account for
 1136 outside threats to communication and technological systems of all those organizations involved?
 1137 What will be the effect of shipping on organ acquisition costs and who will ultimately bear these
 1138 cost changes? Other considerations include how a continuous distribution framework will impact
 1139 decision making between imported organs with greater ischemic times and organs that travel less or
 1140 little distance with considerably less ischemic time and the timing of acceptance decisions.

1141
 1142 e. Problems with computing the composite allocation score: As described above, the composite
 1143 allocation score quantifies how important each candidate attribute is in organ allocation, but there
 1144 are multiple methods for determining these weights. From an equity perspective, will CAS mitigate
 1145 existing disparities, merely replicating existing biases in a new system, or will its new approach find
 1146 greater equity for existing disparities? From an autonomy perspective, how might the changes
 1147 impact the amount of trust patients have for the system? Will the CAS confuse patients and increase
 1148 uncertainty, or will it empower patients? In making large changes and relying on historical data, CAS
 1149 increases uncertainty for certain populations who are underrepresented in current transplant data,
 1150 rendering the impact on those populations even less clear. It will therefore be important for the
 1151 sponsoring committees to evaluate the new framework continually for unintended consequences
 1152 (such as undermining communitarian engagement of the public with transplant efforts, fall in organ
 1153 donation rates, etc.). Finally, as the sponsoring committees evaluate the development of the CAS,
 1154 they also have an opportunity to improve the process for ensuring the representation of and
 1155 engagement of stakeholders.

1156

1157 Conclusion: Assessing the Overall Outlook in the Move to Continuous
1158 Distribution

1159 On balance, notwithstanding the formidable challenges enumerated in this white paper which should be
1160 addressed as continuous distribution is adopted as the new allocation system, the move away from
1161 arbitrary units makes sense and is supportable. This move to a national plan, it is important to bear in
1162 mind, remains distinct from the larger issue of national sharing of resources, and it will be important to
1163 make sure that vulnerable populations in the nation do not bear disproportionate consequences as a
1164 result. There is reason to be optimistic, however, that the move to a continuous distribution framework
1165 can ensure that the OPTN Board and the sponsoring committees consider the ethical principles of utility,
1166 equity, transparency, and autonomy to assist them with incorporating the appropriate correctives for
1167 disadvantaged or underserved populations within the larger whole. In this respect, justified on a case by
1168 case basis, it may be that the retention of some geographic considerations that are adaptable are
1169 appropriate and ethical. The hope is that a move to continuous distribution will allow for a more
1170 granular consideration of attributes in order to allow for the maximum amount of attention to individual
1171 patient circumstances. Indeed, a scoring system of allocation, as opposed to a classification system, has
1172 the potential to be more patient-centered and is consistent with the goal of improving accuracy and
1173 increased attention to each individual patient. Overall, therefore, there are strong grounds to conclude
1174 that the move to continuous distribution is ethically justified and something which will improve the
1175 overall welfare and well-being of patients.